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INTRODUCTION 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has developed largely through a 
pluralistic process.1  Its earliest codifications were inspired in no small part by 
religious and moral thinking.2  Secular academic writers soon joined the process, 
making central contributions that are still cited as authoritative centuries later.3  All 
the while, States published and refined military manuals and articles of war to 
instruct their armed forces in rules for the conduct of warfare.4  By the late 
nineteenth century, States began to codify accepted expressions of IHL that 
accounted broadly for military custom, as well as notions of humanity, in a budding 
corpus of positive international law.5  The compounded horrors of new weapons and 
industrial-scale battlefields fueled this and further codification.6  While the twentieth 
century saw treaties take pride of place among IHL sources, customary international 
law, judgments of military and international tribunals, military legal doctrine, and 
humanitarian and academic commentary also helped to shape the content and 
evolution of IHL.7 
Pluralism, however useful at accounting for diverse interests, has not come 
without cost.  Despite prolonged attention and development, IHL exhibits a high 
degree of ambiguity.  Few legal disciplines rival the indeterminacy of IHL.  As Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht, then Whewell Professor of International Law at the University 
of Cambridge and later judge on the International Court of Justice, famously 
observed, “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law 
of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international 
law.”8  Confronted with a cacophony of inputs—private and public, military and 
civilian, domestic and international—the IHL lawyer frequently finds clarity and 
 
 1.   LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26–64 (3d ed. 2008); 
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 15–35 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); see generally GEOFFREY 
BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980). 
 2.   See generally G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the Historical 
Development of the Law of War, 5 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 3 (1965). 
 3.   See generally M. H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (Michael Hurst ed., 
1965). 
 4.   The paradigmatic example is the Lieber Code approved by President Lincoln for use by the 
Union Army during the U.S. Civil War.  Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004); Rick Beard, The Lieber Codes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http:// opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/the-lieber-codes/. 
 5.   E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the 
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:  Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429. 
 6.   This dynamic was represented most notably by the work of Henri Dunant.  See PIERRE BOISSIER, 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS:  FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA 
19–25 (1985) (describing the gruesome aftermath of the Battle of Solferino that Dunant described in a 
book that was to inspire the creation of the International Red Cross). 
 7.   See generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994). 
 8.   Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 360, 
382 (1952). 
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consensus elusive.  Sorting IHL noise from notes requires considerable legal, 
military, and political experience.  The content and operation of even cardinal IHL 
principles such as distinction remain subject to voluble debate. 
While a measure of its indeterminacy is surely attributable to IHL’s pluralistic 
process of development, an equal measure must be traced to the unique and peculiar 
purpose of IHL.  IHL is a body of law that countenances intentional killing and 
deprivation of liberty on a grand scale in pursuit of national interests, which may not 
be benign.  It expressly allows for the deaths of innocents and destruction of their 
property to achieve military aims, while imposing obligations and requiring 
precautions that can expose combatants to tangibly greater danger.  Yet, IHL also 
humanizes bloody battlefields.  When respected, it can save lives and ensure humane 
treatment, preserving a degree of humanity in both the victims and victors of war. 
In light of these competing dynamics, the interpretation and development of 
IHL must be handled delicately.  A highly reactive body of law, IHL has seen 
evolutionary and even revolutionary changes instituted by States following armed 
conflicts—the classic example being adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.9  Those with the expertise and experience to 
fully appreciate the fragile IHL balance between military necessity and humanity 
that provides its foundational raison d’etre have been the key drivers of this process 
of change.10  Historically, States, and their military representatives in particular, have 
played this critical role in shaping the contours of IHL.  To be sure, proposals by 
academics and non-governmental organizations have fostered significant 
enhancements of IHL.  But this has occurred only after deliberate and studied 
consideration and acceptance by government experts and States uniquely positioned 
to evaluate the operational and even strategic costs of legal innovation.  The result 
was an IHL reasonably assured to reflect the best achievable balance of military 
necessity and humanity—an IHL at once acceptable to the States and armed forces 
charged with its implementation and to the advocates for war’s inevitable victims. 
While the IHL dialogue remains vigorous, continuation of its pluralistic nature 
appears in doubt.  In particular, a void of State participation, especially with respect 
to opinio juris, has formed.  One no longer finds regular State expressions of IHL 
opinio juris.  Nor does one regularly find comprehensive and considered responses 
by States to the proposals and pronouncements of non-State IHL participants.  In 
many respects, as this article will demonstrate, the guns of State IHL opinio juris 
have fallen silent. 
 
 9.   Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) 
[hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC III]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC IV]. 
 10.   See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law:  
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 806–22  (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Military 
Necessity] (describing the discourse among States and military leaders, humanitarian NGOs, and nascent 
international courts and tribunals in shaping IHL’s response to military necessity concerns). 
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Meanwhile, non-State IHL actors have been undeterred, even emboldened. The 
IHL contributions of the international legal academy have been particularly 
voluminous. Some are of exceptional quality.  However, academia has also 
incentivized the production of decidedly unconventional IHL perspectives. While 
useful to illustrate or deconstruct normative architecture, many such efforts not only 
eschew rigorous legal analysis, but also display insensitivity to the realities of battle 
in favor of interpretive creativity or innovation. Indeed, many authors and pundits 
boldly masquerade legal innovations as accepted understandings of IHL.11 Even 
more troubling is the fact that many scholars lacking the appropriate education or 
experiential background have responded to the fact that IHL is a topic au courant by 
claiming IHL expert status.  Their work product misstates basic principles and rules 
with distressing frequency, and they are too often set forth in an ad hominem 
manner.  All of these contributions, from the superb to the sub-standard, exert 
informal but real pressure on the shape of IHL. 
Further complicating the IHL process, while helping to drown out what little 
State opinio juris one finds today, are the burgeoning efforts of humanitarian 
advocacy groups.  These organizations and their members have long performed the 
valuable role of counterweight, urging States not to lead the law unduly askew in the 
pursuit of narrow national interests.  Yet, assertions of law by humanitarian groups 
must be considered with some degree of care as their work in explicating IHL 
understandably (and often appropriately) reflects the legal causes and policies of 
their constituencies.  Additionally, where they stand with respect to IHL depends on 
where they sit; what they observe and conclude about the battlefield and its law is 
always a function of their perceived mandates.  Humanitarian activists working 
exclusively to alleviate the suffering of civilians and other protected persons will 
inevitably appreciate IHL differently than, for instance, soldiers charged with 
winning a battle or State policy-makers responsible for leading a nation to victory. 
Other non-State entities also indirectly, but effectively, shape IHL.  Foremost 
among these is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  The ICRC is 
undoubtedly the most influential single body in the field; indeed, few organizations 
or States field the IHL expertise or experience of its impressive Legal Division.  
However, in assessing issues arising from the military necessity-humanity balance, 
the ICRC unsurprisingly (and again often appropriately) tends to resolve grey areas 
in favor of humanitarian considerations, much as militaries usually do vis-à-vis 
military necessity.  The United Nations Human Rights Council has also now included 
IHL matters within its portfolio.  Although the Council’s efforts have sometimes 
reflected a misunderstanding of IHL and inappropriately conflated IHL and human 
rights law,12 more recent work has proved quite sophisticated and well measured.13  
 
 11.   Of particular note is the IHL blogosphere that has recently materialized.  It serves to 
conveniently highlight emerging issues and provides a first glimpse of IHL analysis.  However, bloggers 
are frequently unable to offer the depth or expertise called for by complex IHL issues. 
 12.   See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories:  
Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, para. 284, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 
2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (“A convergence between human rights protections and 
humanitarian law protections is also in operation. The rules contained in Article 75 of Additional Protocol 
I (AP I), which reflect customary law, define a series of fundamental guarantees and protections, such as 
the prohibitions against torture, murder and inhuman conditions of detention, recognized also under 
human rights law.”). 
 13.   See generally Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
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And, of course, the growing number of international tribunals—standing, ad hoc, and 
bifurcated—that also pronounce on the scope and meaning of IHL, often in 
confounding prolixity, must be added to this complex admixture of non-State 
influences on IHL content and vector. 
In the face of these and other influences, it is essential to recall that States, and 
only States, “make” IHL.14  They alone enjoy legal competency to interpret 
international law beyond the confines of a particular case.  States do so either 
through treaty or through “general practice accepted as law,” the latter component 
known as customary international law.15  As will be explained, expressions of opinio 
juris operate as the fulcrum around which new customary humanitarian law norms 
crystallize, as well as a basis for the contextual interpretation and development of 
existing treaty and customary IHL principles and rules. 
Expressions of opinio juris are a tool by which States regulate the emergence, 
interpretation, and evolution of legal norms.  Effectively employed, they may 
maximize achievement and protection of States’ perceived national interests.  By 
failing regularly to offer such expressions, States risk unintended Grotian Moments, 
that is, “radical developments in which new rules and doctrines of customary 
international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.”16  Such episodes do 
not necessarily create “bad” law, nor do they always run contrary to States’ interests 
or intentions, but they often represent brief periods when States’ ability to reason 
objectively is at its nadir.  They are therefore a suboptimal time for States to engage 
in activities that amount to norm formation and development. 
This article sets forth thoughts regarding the performance of States, particularly 
the United States, in this informal process of meta-norm formation and evolution.  
Although the topic of the symposium from which the article emanated was the law of 
cyber warfare, the discussion is decidedly non-cyber in nature.  It is intentionally so, 
as the objective is to identify recent tendencies in the process that might foreshadow 
how IHL governing cyber operations is likely to develop absent a reversal of current 
trends.  Our examination suggests that non-State actors are outpacing and, in some 
cases displacing, State action in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  States seem 
reticent to offer expressions of opinio juris, often for good reasons.  We argue that 
such reticence comes at a costdiminished influence on the content and application 
of IHL.  In our view, States have underestimated this cost and must act to resume 
their intended role in the process. 
 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 10, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter Emmerson Report]; Human Rights 
Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter Heyns Report]. 
 14.   But see, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors:  
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 109 
(2012) (“[I]t is worth questioning whether nonstate armed groups can and should be given a role in the 
creation of the international law that governs conflicts to which they are parties.”). 
 15.   Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993; see generally THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW:  LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2009). 
 16.   MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL 
CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 1 (2013).  The attacks of 9/11 undoubtedly generated one 
such moment for jus ad bellum. 
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I. OPINIO JURIS 
State assessments of international law have long held a critical place in the law 
of nations.  More than mere commentary, States’ expressions of the perceived extent 
and content of their international legal obligations are key constitutive elements of 
international law.  In particular, expressions of opinio juris, when combined with 
evidence of general State practice, form the basis of binding customary law.17  Like 
treaties and general principles of law, customary law is a primary component of 
international law.18  Absent meaningful and regular expressions of opinio juris by 
States, prospective customary law founders and extant customary law stagnates. 
Opinio juris also animates the interpretation and application of IHL treaties.19  
As noted in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a]ny 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation” is a relevant consideration when 
interpreting a treaty’s provisions.20  Opinio juris serves as the vessel through which 
said agreement is revealed.21  Moreover, when the context in which treaty provisions 
apply changes, subsequent expressions of opinio juris as to their application in the 
new environment, combined with corresponding State practice in their 
implementation, are the mechanisms by which treaty law remains relevant.22 
Expressions of opinio juris are especially meaningful with respect to emerging 
domains of State interaction not anticipated when the present law emerged in the 
form of either treaty or customary law.23  Few such domains rival cyber conflict in 
this regard.24  It is understandable, therefore, that scholars and non-State 
organizations lavish attention on the question of how international law regulates 
cyber operations.25  States, unfortunately, seem to be falling behind, continuing a 
trend that has been underway with respect to IHL generally for some time.26 
 
 17.   Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993; see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (“[T]he formulation in the [ICJ] Statute serves to emphasize that 
the substance of [international custom] of international law is to be found in the practice of states.”). 
 18.   See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 (stating that the International Court of Justice should consult customary international law 
when resolving disputes). 
 19.   See Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties, 322 
RECUEIL DES COURS 243 (2006) (discussing the relationship between treaties and customary international 
law). 
 20.   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   See generally id. 
 23.   See id. art. 38 (“Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”). 
 24.   Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, The Emergence of Legal Norms for Cyber Conflict, in BINARY 
BULLETS:  THE ETHICS OF CYBERWARFARE (Fritz Allhoff et al., 2015) (forthcoming). 
 25.   E.g., MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2014); NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, PEACETIME REGIME FOR ACTIVITIES IN 
CYBERSPACE:  INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND DIPLOMACY (Katarina 
Ziolkowski ed., 2013); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure:  A Use of 
Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207 (2002); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected 
Consequences from Knock-On Effects:  A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1145 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, Rewired Warfare:  Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack, 
96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS (forthcoming) [hereinafter Schmitt, Rewired Warfare], available at 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
2015] THE DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OPINIO JURIS 195 
 
II. OPINIO JURIS AVERSION 
While there are frequently valid reasons for States’ failure to offer clear, 
unequivocal indications of the practices they have undertaken or refrained from (or 
express their views on the actions of other States) out of a sense of international legal 
obligation,27 risks attend inaction.  Of greatest significance is the risk of legal 
vacuums left to be filled by actors who lack the de jure authority but not willingness 
to do so. 
This willingness is especially evident with regard to IHL.  Over recent decades, 
there has been a flurry of activity by non-State actors seeking to advance views of 
how IHL is to be interpreted and applied, and how it should develop.28  Efforts by 
humanitarian and other non-governmental organizations, international tribunals, and 
academics have proved tremendously influential in this fecund normative 
environment,29 one in which States have largely remained mute.30  A brief 
examination of some of the more noteworthy instances illustrates the nature of this 
dynamic and presages how events may unfold if States do not engage proactively in 
the application of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict. 
The ICRC has led a number of recent efforts to clarify and progressively 
develop IHL.31  More than a private humanitarian relief organization, the ICRC has 
long held a special place in the field.32  It is commonly referred to as the “guardian of 
international humanitarian law.”33  Reflecting its mandate “to work for the 
understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472800; Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber 
Warfare:  Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269 (2014); Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net 
War:  Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2009). 
 26.   See, e.g., Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14, at 108 (describing how States are “particularly 
hostile” to granting non-State actors any lawmaking power in international law); Schmitt, Military 
Necessity, supra note 10, at 811–14 (describing various States’ apprehension regarding the adoption 
number of treaties adopted by international law). 
 27.   See, e.g., Sean Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris and Law of Armed Conflict Pluralism, JUST 
SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1870/reviving-opinio-juris-law-armed-conflict-pluralism-
2/ [hereinafter Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris] (explaining how an official of the federal government always 
prefaces his or her remarks with a “pro forma reminder that nothing [he or] she will say necessarily 
reflects the views” of his or her agency or the U.S. government on any international matters). 
 28.   See, e.g., Schmitt, Military Necessity, supra note 10, at 822 (“Nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have increasingly moved from oversight and advocacy of human right into the field of 
international humanitarian law.  In particular, a number of prominent organizations have begun to issue 
reports on IHL compliance during armed conflicts.”). 
 29.   See, e.g., id. at 816–37 (describing how NGOs, international tribunals, and academic writings have 
influenced the development of international law). 
 30.   See, e.g., Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris, supra note 27 (describing how States’ lack of participation 
in the dialogue regarding law of armed conflict is in contrast to the thriving commentary of non-States). 
 31.   See Yves Sandoz, The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International 
Humanitarian Law, ICRC RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 31, 1998) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ 
documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm (“In short, [the ICRC] has made a very direct contribution to 
the process of codification, during which its proposals were examined, and which has led to regular 
revision and extension of international humanitarian law  . . . .”). 
 32.   Id.; see generally BOISSIER, supra note 6; ANDRÉ DURAND, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: FROM SARAJEVO TO HIROSHIMA (1984); CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, 
DUNANT’S DREAM: WAR, SWITZERLAND AND THE HISTORY OF THE RED CROSS (1998). 
 33.   Sandoz, supra note 31. 
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applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof,”34 the ICRC 
has recently published two highly influential studies and is in the process of 
producing a third.35  Each has been, or is likely soon to be, viewed as a dependable 
expression of customary IHL, relied on by jurists and IHL practitioners, including 
State legal advisers.36  Yet, as this Section will illustrate, the studies have provoked 
no serious response on the part of States and States have launched no comparable 
efforts of their own. 
In 1995, the ICRC commissioned its Legal Division to conduct a large-scale 
study to codify “customary rules of IHL applicable in international and non-
international armed conflicts.”37  Carried out over a span of ten years in consultation 
with over 150 legal experts, the resulting Customary International Humanitarian Law 
study (the Study) includes three volumes of work, running to well over 3,000 pages.38  
The Study is a work of breathtaking breadth and depth, one deeply rooted in a 
conscientious effort to discern State practice and opinio juris applicable to armed 
conflict.39  It has been profoundly influential and is regularly cited by courts and 
commentators as authoritative on a number of points relating to the state of 
customary IHL.40 
Considering the importance of the topics addressed, the comprehensiveness of 
its coverage, and the fact that the ICRC regularly informed States of its work, one 
might have expected the Study to rouse strong reactions from States, either in the 
form of approval or detailed disagreement therewith.41  It did not.  On the contrary, 
 
 34.   Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross art. 4(g), Oct. 3 2013, 
http://www.icrc.org /eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm. 
 35.   31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Nov. 28–Dec. 1, 2011, 
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 3, 31IC/11/5.1.2 
(Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ICRC Challenges]. 
 36.   See infra note 41 and accompanying text; cf. Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131, 168 
(Elizabeth Wilmshurst  & Susan Breau eds., 2007) [hereinafter Schmitt, Law of Targeting] (discussing the 
acceptance by States of general targeting Rules set forth in the Study “as a correct enunciation” of 
targeting norms). 
 37.   26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Dec. 3–7, 1995, 
International Humanitarian Law:  From Law to Action-Report on the Follow-up to the International 
Conference on the Protection of War Victims, Annex II, in 78 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 58, 84 (1996) 
[hereinafter ICRC, From Law to Action]. 
 38.   1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; 2 INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; 3 INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 3 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; see also Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law:  A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 473, 474 (2007) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Response].  Volume I of the Study features 161 Rules 
and accompanying commentary.  1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY. Volumes II and III compile an impressive 
catalogue of support for the Study’s rules and commentary.  2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY; 3 CUSTOMARY 
IHL STUDY.  An online database supplements these volumes, regularly updating its sourcing and citations.  
Customary IHL:  Practice, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2 (last visited Apr. 30, 
2015). 
 39.   Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 ISR. Y.B. 
HUM. RTS. 1, 1  (2006). 
 40.   See e.g., id. 
 41.   The Study provoked significant commentary from jurists and academic commentators.  See 
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most States remained silent, thereby begging the question of whether the majority of 
States are of the view that the ICRC “got it right.” 
The United States was one of only a few States to respond to the Study.  Shortly 
after publication, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department and the General 
Counsel to the U.S. Department of Defense published a joint 22-page response to 
the ICRC President.42  The letter, which purports only to review “a cross-section” of 
the Study, objects chiefly to the methodology used to identify customary 
international law, in particular alleging the Study affords too much weight to thin or 
selective samples of State practice.43  The Legal Adviser and General Counsel also 
take issue with the Study’s approach to opinio juris, noting that only “positive 
evidence . . . that States consider themselves legally obligated” can satisfy the opinio 
juris element of customary international law.44 
Several of the letter’s criticisms are compelling, especially with respect to the 
Study’s reliance on non-binding instruments, such as United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions and the ICRC’s own prior work on IHL.45  Overall, though, 
the letter lacks the thoroughness and heft expected of a response to such a significant 
and influential work.  Indeed, only four pages of the letter provide general remarks,46 
with the remainder devoted to comments on just four rules:  respect and protection 
of humanitarian relief personnel; protection of the environment; expanding bullets; 
and universal jurisdiction.47  Many experts in the field were surprised the United 
States would issue such a letter and select only four relatively peripheral topics to 
address, while avoiding such core issues as the law governing attacks or detention.48 
To be fair, the U.S. letter notes that the Study’s length precluded a full review 
so soon after publication.  The letter states, “The United States will continue its 
review and expects to provide additional comments or otherwise make its views 
known in due course.”49  Yet in the intervening eight years, the United States has 
offered no further official comment on the Study and no such effort appears to be 
underway.  Meanwhile, the Study continues to grow in influence, in great part 
because it remains the sole comprehensive work dedicated to discerning customary 
IHL available to jurists, scholars, and even State practitioners and legal advisors.50  
 
generally id.; George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law—An Interpretation on 
Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503 (2005).  Chatham House 
conducted a year long study on the Study that resulted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Elizabeth Wilmshurst  & Susan Breau eds., 2007). 
 42.   John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
443 (2007). 
 43.   Id. at 444–45. 
 44.   Id. at 447. 
 45.   E.g., id. at 457. 
 46.   See id. at 443–46 (listing general marks about methodological concerns and international law 
principles). 
 47.   Id. at 448–71 
 48.   See, e.g., Noura Erakat, The U.S. v. the Red Cross:  Customary International Humanitarian Law 
and Universal Jurisdiction, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 226 (2013) (comparing and contrasting the 
approach taken by the Red Cross and the approach favored in the U.S. response). 
 49.   Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 444. 
 50.   See generally Schmitt, Law of targeting, supra note 36, at 134–35. 
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While the ICRC may lack the de jure competency to express opinio juris, in the 
absence of State action in that regard, the organization has de facto filled the void. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the ICRC conducted a second major project aimed at 
developing and clarifying the legal consequences of civilian presence on the 
battlefield.51  A succession of conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s led to an 
infusion of civilians onto the battlefield, both participants from the region (e.g., 
armed groups of civilians) and civilian contractors associated with foreign armed 
forces.52  Subsequent armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continued and even 
accelerated these trends.53  In response, the ICRC decided in 2003 to examine the 
parameters of an important exception to the requirement that armed forces 
distinguish between civilians and combatants and only direct violence at the latter.54  
The exception provides that civilians lose their protection from attack for such time 
as they directly participate in hostilities.55 
Participation in hostilities by civilians has long presented a host of humanitarian 
and tactical challenges.56  Civilian fighters frequently fail to distinguish themselves 
visually from the surrounding civilian population,57 a practice that frustrates the 
ability of armed forces to honor the foundational IHL principle of distinction.58  
Civilian fighters also regularly shift back and forth between peaceful activities and 
 
 51.   NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8 (2009) 
[hereinafter DPH GUIDANCE]. 
 52.   See, e.g., Trevor A. Keck, Not All Civilians Are Created Equal:  The Principle of Distinction, the 
Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare, 211 
MIL. L. REV. 115, 123–25 (2012) (discussing the increase in civilian casualties in the 1990s as well as the 
difficulties posed by humanitarian efforts during the Balkan wars). 
 53.   See, e.g., id. at 126–27 (citing Afghanistan for exemplifying the increase in civilian presence on the 
battlefield). 
 54.   Civilian “Direct Participation in Hostilities”:  Overview, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/ eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/participation-hostilities/overview-
direct-participation.htm. 
 55.   Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].  The notion of direct participation is widely viewed as customary in 
nature.  For instance, the United States is a party to neither instrument, having ratified neither, but the 
concept appears in DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 8-3 (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M].  
See also 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (detailing civilians’ loss of protection from attack).  History can 
also be used to establish custom.  See Keck, supra note 52, at 117 (stating that “the obligation to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants” has been recognized as early as the 5th century 
B.C.E.). 
 56.   See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, “BETWEEN A DRONE AND AL-QAEDA”:  THE CIVILIAN COST OF 
US TARGETED KILLINGS IN YEMEN 80–81 (2013) [hereinafter CIVILIAN COST] (discussing civilian 
casualties resulting from US targeted killings in Yemen). 
 57.   This article uses the term “fighter” in lieu of “combatant” because combatancy is a concept 
involving issues of detention and belligerent immunity and has only derivative significance in the law of 
targeting.  Moreover, the law of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) does not include a concept of 
combatancy.  Cf. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL 
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2006) [hereinafter 
NIAC MANUAL] (employing the term “fighters” as opposed to “combatants” to avoid confusion with 
international law of armed conflict) 
 58.   AP I art. 48; DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 993. 
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participation in hostilities—the so-called, “farmer-by-day-fighter-by-night” or 
“revolving door” dilemma—thereby raising the question of when such individuals 
may be attacked.59  Although the challenge of how to deal with civilians on the 
battlefield was certainly not new in 2003,60 the ICRC recognized the need to clarify 
the underlying law and accordingly convened a group of international law experts to 
consider the matter.61  In 2008, the ICRC published the Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation (the Guidance) setting forth its views on the subject.62 
The Guidance, and the process that produced it, examined the legal regime 
governing civilian direct participation in hostilities through the lens of the widely 
ratified 1977 Additional Protocols I and II (AP I for international armed conflict 
(IAC)63 and AP II for non-international armed conflict (NIAC))64 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.65 Articles in each of the Protocols provide: “Civilians shall 
enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.”66 Though undoubtedly an important concession to the 
realities of combat, and although all of the experts involved in the project agreed that 
the provisions accurately restated customary law,67 these two brief articles have been 
exceptionally difficult to interpret and implement in practice.68  The range of 
activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities and the temporal aspect of 
the exception were especially unclear to many Parties to the Protocols.69  Of course, 
the same problems attend their interpretation and implementation in their customary 
guise for non-Parties to the Protocols such as the United States, Pakistan, India, and 
 
 59.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1034–36. 
 60.   See id. at 993 (noting that there has been “[a] continuous shift of the conduct of hostilities into 
civilian population centres” in recent decades). 
 61.   Id. at 991–92 
 62.   Id. at 1034–37. 
 63.   AP I art. 1(4). 
 64.   AP II art. 1(1). 
 65.   AP I; AP II.  A number of militarily significant States have not ratified the Protocols including, 
inter alia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States.  On 
the U.S. position vis-à-vis particular provisions thereof, see generally George Cadwalader Jr., The Rules 
Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949:  A 
Review of the Relevant United States References, in 14 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. L. 133 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Louise Arimatsu eds., 2011). 
 66.   AP I art. 51(3); AP II art. 13(3). 
 67.   In remarks in 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, Michael J. Matheson, 
stated, “We . . . support the principle . . . that immunity [is] not be extended to civilians who are taking 
part in hostilities.” Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States 
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Convention, Remarks at the 6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law 
Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 2, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 426 
(1987). 
 68.   See id. at 510 (noting Lieutenant Colonel Burrus M. Carnahan’s statement that “[t]he main 
problem in interpreting these provisions is how much civilians must participate in the war effort before the 
Protocol no longer protects them” and that “[t]he standard of the Protocol . . . furnishes little 
clarification”). 
 69.   See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (“It is fair to conclude . . . that outside the few uncontested 
examples . . . in particular use of weapons or other means to commit acts of violence against human or 
material enemy forces, a clear and uniform definition of direct participation in hostilities has not been 
developed in State practice.”). 
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Israel.70  Although the Guidance proposes understandings and interpretive glosses 
for both issues,71 the ICRC was unable to secure unanimity thereon among the 
experts it had convened.72  In fact, a group of notable experts withdrew from the 
project altogether in its final months.73 
Expert dissent notwithstanding, the Guidance, as with the Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study before it, has been a markedly influential 
cynosure.  For instance, it has found its way into military training for a number of 
NATO States and has affected the content of NATO rules of engagement in 
Afghanistan.74  Despite these important practical effects, the Guidance has not 
attracted any definitive and comprehensive reaction from States.  The scarcity of 
sovereign responses is especially curious and concerning with respect to States 
thought to disagree with aspects of the Guidance. 
The United States has long embraced, albeit not publically by means of an 
expression of opinio juris, an understanding of direct participation and its 
consequences somewhat at odds with the Guidance.  As an example, the Guidance 
asserts that there must be a direct causal link between the act in question and the 
harm caused to the enemy.75  If an intervening event is required to effect harm, the 
civilian in question generally has not taken direct part in hostilities and retains 
protection from attack.76  Most often cited in expert discussions as an example of 
how this approach would be implemented is the ICRC’s characterization of assembly 
and storage of an improvised explosive device (IED) as indirect participation.77  The 
contrary view is that the nexus between such activities and the subsequent IED 
attack renders those individuals engaging in the assembly and storage targetable as 
direct participants.78  Although this position has not been expressed in the form of 
 
 70.   See for instance, discussion of the subject by the Israeli Supreme Court in HCJ 769/02 Pub. 
Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. (2) IsrLR 459, 488–92 [2006], the holding of which is also 
summarized in Mark E. Wojcik, Introductory Note to the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The 
Government of Israel, 46 I.L.M. 373 (2007). 
 71.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1012–37 (describing what constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities and the temporal scope of losing protection due to direct participation in hostilities). 
 72.   Id. at 992. 
 73.   For a published discussion on the points of contention by individuals who participated in the 
project, and an ICRC response thereto, see generally Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”:  The Time 
Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Nils Melzer, 
Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity:  A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 831 (2010) [hereinafter Melzer, Response]; W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation 
in Hostilities” Study:  No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 
(2010) [hereinafter Parks, Part IX]; Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities:  
The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Elements]; 
Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost:  Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 (2010). 
 74.   Cf. Schmitt, Elements, supra note 73, at 699–732 (providing examples of how direct participation 
in hostilities influences military performance and conflicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan). 
 75.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 995–96. 
 76.   Id. at 1022–23. 
 77.   Id. at 1021–22. 
 78.   See Watkin, supra note 73, at 681 (“To limit direct participation to persons who place or detonate 
explosives is an artificial division of what is fundamentally a group activity.”). 
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opinio juris, there is State practice in both Afghanistan and Iraq to suggest this is the 
U.S. position.79 
Similar disagreement revolves around the issue of when civilians who 
participate in hostilities may be targeted.  The Guidance states that the “for such 
time” language in the rules is limited to periods in which the civilian in question is 
actually engaging in “[m]easures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of 
direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from 
the location of its execution.”80  It goes on to provide that “the ‘revolving door’ of 
civilian protection is an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL.”81  In other words, 
the Guidance argues the “for such time” language should be interpreted literally as 
meaning that unless a civilian is then preparing the specific act, conducting it, or 
returning from that act, he or she is not targetable.82  U.S. practice is not in accord.83  
From a military operational perspective, it seems irrational to prohibit targeting a 
civilian who has, perhaps on several occasions, conducted attacks on U.S. forces, and 
is likely to do so at some point in the future, merely because he or she has managed 
to return home following an operation and is not yet in the process of preparing a 
specific future attack.84  Unfortunately, the United States has offered no clear 
expressions of opinio juris on the matter to accompany their practice.85  In this void, 
the ICRC view is increasingly gaining traction.86 
The issue of how to treat groups of civilian fighters, as distinct from individuals, 
also remains a point of contention.  In the Guidance, the ICRC helpfully assimilates 
organized armed groups not meeting the requirements of combatant status to the 
armed forces for targeting purposes.87  In other words, members of such groups may 
be targeted even when they are not directly participating in the hostilities.88  And 
because they are targetable in the first place, any incidental harm to them caused 
during an attack on other persons or places would not qualify as collateral damage 
for the purposes of the proportionality and precautions in attack analyses.89 
 
 79.   Cf. id. (explaining that the approach in the Guidance is impracticable in situations such as the 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
 80.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1031. 
 81.   Id. at 1035. 
 82.   See id. at 1007–08 (indicating that the “determination remains subject to all feasible precautions 
and to the presumption of protection in case of doubt”). 
 83.   Cf. Matheson, supra note 67, at 420 (describing the U.S. policy to follow international guidance 
only when it is elevated to customary law status). 
 84.   See Melzer, Response, supra note 73, at 879 (“[Air Commodore] Boothby contends that the 
[Guidance’s] interpretation of the temporal scope of direct participation in hostilities, and of the ensuing 
loss of protection, is too restrictive to make [] sense on the modern battlefield.”(internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 85.   Cf. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 446–47 (describing US opposition to existence of opinio 
juris necessary to elevate principles in ICRC study to customary law). 
 86.   See Melzer, Response, supra note 73, at 909–13 (identifying recent agreement of several States—
including Israel—with some principles set forth in the DPH Guidance despite U.S. reservation). 
 87.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1006–09. 
 88.   Id. 
 89.   See AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b) (describing generally precautions in attacks 
required under the protocol for civilians). 
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However, the Guidance restricts exposure to lawful targeting to those members 
having a “continuous combat function” in the group.90  The parameters of the notion 
are roughly analogous to those of direct participation.  By the Guidance’s approach, 
the “for such time” limitation does not apply to individuals who have a continuous 
combat function in an organized armed group; they may be attacked at any time 
irrespective of whether they are engaging in hostilities at the moment.91  But for 
those members of the group who do not have such a function, the paradigmatic case 
being a cook who accompanies the fighters, the basic direct participation in hostilities 
rule for individuals applies such that they may only be attacked while so 
participating.92 
The ICRC acceptance of the concept of a targetable organized armed group 
goes a long way towards meeting the long-standing U.S. concerns regarding the 
“revolving door.”93  Nevertheless, U.S. State practice neither limits targeting of a 
group’s members to those with a continuous combat function nor requires harm to 
other members of the group to be considered in the proportionality or precautions in 
attack analysis when those with a continuous combat function are attacked.94  On the 
contrary, such individuals would be treated analogously to members of the armed 
forces, that is, susceptible to lawful targeting based on mere membership in a group 
that has an express purpose of participating in the hostilities.95  Given the importance 
of the issue vis-à-vis counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, one would 
have expected the United States to have staked out a firm position thereon.  It has 
not, at least not in a manner that would constitute a clear expression of opinio juris 
on this important matter.96 
States’ interests in actively addressing the direct participation question are not 
limited to resolving interpretive challenges for purposes of targeting.  The issue now 
appears to bear on other important IHL questions such as the use of civilian 
contractors to perform military functions more generally and whether civilian 
participation in hostilities constitutes an international war crime.97 This trend, 
 
 90.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1007–08 
 91.   See id. at 1007 (observing that individual membership in an organized armed group is contingent 
on a continuous combat function). 
 92.   See id. (“[U]nder IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized armed 
group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct 
participation in hostilities . . . .”). 
 93.   See generally W. Parks Hays, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 94.   See id. at 118–31 (discussing the historical development of the concept of the “revolving door” 
and the United States’ disagreement with it). 
 95.   Cf. 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (noting that the United States rejects a strict interpretation of 
the rule requiring the classification of an individual as a civilian when his status is in doubt and 
acknowledges a combatant’s discretion in making such a classification). 
 96.   Cf. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 443–44 (“[T]he United States is not in a position to 
accept without further analysis that the [ICRC’s] conclusions that particular rules related to the laws and 
customs of war in fact reflect customary international law.”). 
 97.   See e.g., Mark David “Max” Maxwell & Sean Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’:  Legal Status, 
Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 20 (2007) (asserting that the classification of 
civilians as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ confuses the distinct issues of legal status and culpability).  But 
see David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Use of Military Commissions in the War on Terror, 24 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 123, 131 (2006) (stating that the United States’ stance that unlawful combatants are subject ‘to 
trial and punishment by military tribunals’ is not universally favored). 
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unsupported by the ICRC and most serious IHL experts, is counter-normative.98  But 
more active State opinio juris on the direct participation question in general, and 
responses to the Guidance in particular, would greatly clarify matters. 
A further incentive for States to respond actively to the Guidance can be found 
in a controversial provision on the resort to lethal force.  The Guidance asserts that 
“the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to 
protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”99  
Restated, attackers must resort to capture or other non-lethal means when feasible in 
the circumstances.  As an example, 
an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone to 
transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an attacking air force would 
probably be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.  Should the 
restaurant in question be situated within an area firmly controlled by the 
opposing party, however, it may be possible to neutralize the military 
threat posed by that civilian through capture or other non-lethal means 
without additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian 
population.100 
The approach attracted significant pushback and criticism from numerous 
prominent IHL scholars.101 Indeed, the “least harm” provision prompted several 
experts to withdraw from the project.102  Moreover, the provision is at odds with 
many States’ practice vis-à-vis conducting attacks and crafting rules of 
engagement.103  While it is common for States to require their forces to capture when 
possible, such instructions are motivated by the operational need to acquire 
actionable intelligence, not by any sense that they are legally obligated to do so.104  
Yet, the Guidance’s discussion appears to have spawned a movement to entrench the 
least-harmful-means requirement in contemporary IHL understandings105 and has 
sparked a lively academic debate.106  Meanwhile, State input on the issue has been 
 
 98.   See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (stressing that a careful assessment of a civilian should be 
undertaken in determining his status and that attacks against civilians cannot be based on the civilian 
merely appearing dubious). 
 99.   DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1040. 
 100.   Id. at 1043. 
 101.   See Parks, Part IX, supra note 73, at 783–85 (detailing various experts’ objections to the “General 
Restraints on the Use of Force in Direct Attack” section in the DPH Guidance). 
 102.   Id. at 784–85. 
 103.   See id. at 795–96 (noting that the ICRC requested the advice of senior military lawyers from the 
United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada who disagreed with the provision on resort to lethal 
force and were ignored by the ICRC). 
 104.   See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819, 
824–25 (2013) (acknowledging that critics of the least harm provision contend that States commonly 
require their forces to capture, instead of kill, based on “pragmatic strategic and policy choices, not legal 
obligations”). 
 105.   See, e.g., id. at 819 (arguing that “the use of force should instead be governed by a least-
restrictive-means” analysis in certain well-specified and narrow circumstances). 
 106.   Compare Geoffrey Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means 
Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536, 540 (2013) (offering a comprehensive rebuttal of the least harmful means 
interpretation), and Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill:  A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The 
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negligible.107  It is worth considering whether States might have preempted the 
brouhaha with a more active and deliberate response to the Guidance in the form of 
an expression of opinio juris. 
Finally with respect to ICRC efforts to develop IHL, a long-term project is 
underway within the ICRC Legal Division to produce updates to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Commentaries (the Commentaries).108  Originally published in the 
decade following the Conventions’ entry into force,109 the current edition of the 
Commentaries includes a volume addressing each of the four Conventions in 
significant detail, compiling essential historical perspective and details of diplomatic 
processes that produced the Conventions.110  In 1987, the ICRC added a volume of 
similar commentary on the 1977 Protocols.111  Altogether, the five volumes run to 
nearly 3,900 pages with commentary and doctrinal analysis of each of the articles of 
the four Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols.112  The revised 
Commentaries will retain the format of their predecessors while significantly 
updating them with respect to interpretive developments and State practice.113  They 
are expected to occupy a staff of full-time ICRC legal researchers and part-time 
external contributors through the year 2019.114 
 
Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 855, 855 (2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, 
Reply to Ryan Goodman] (arguing that, even under narrow circumstances, there is no obligation under the 
extant international humanitarian law to wound rather than kill enemy combatants nor to capture rather 
than kill), with Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants:  A Rejoinder to Michael 
N. Schmitt, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 863, 863–66 (2013) (addressing the author’s points of agreement and 
disagreement with Michael N. Schmitt’s assertion that there exists no obligation under international 
humanitarian law to capture rather than kill enemy combatants), and Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to 
Capture, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1272 (2013) (examining four potential reasons why the duty to capture 
might be thought to apply to targeted killings). 
 107.   See Schmitt, Reply to Ryan Goodman, supra note 106, at 857 (“[S]ituations presenting a viable 
possibility of wounding instead of killing are so rare that it is counter-intuitive to conclude that states 
intended the ‘method’ language to extend to such circumstances . . .  [M]ost states, non-state organizations 
dealing with IHL, and scholars do not interpret the provision in this manner.  For them, neither killing nor 
capture constitutes a specific method of warfare, although certain tactics designed to kill or capture do.”). 
 108.   Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and Their 
Additional Protocols into the Twenty-First Century, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1551, 1554 (2012) 
[hereinafter Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century]. 
 109.   See id. at 1552 (“[T]he International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proceeded to write a 
detailed Commentary on each of their provisions. This led to the publication between 1952 and 1960 of a 
Commentary on each of the four Geneva Conventions . . . .”). 
 110.   E.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY:  GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA  (Jean S. 
Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY:  GC II]. 
 111.   See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY 
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
 112.   See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY:  GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952); 
ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN 
TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); COMMENTARY:  GC II, supra note 110; ICRC, COMMENTARY:  
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY:  GC III]; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 111. 
 113.   See Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108, at 1554 (“The update will preserve the 
format of the existing Commentaries . . . [and] will provide many references to practice, case law, and 
academic literature, which should facilitate further research and reading.”). 
 114.   See id. at 1554–55 (discussing the drafting process of the update to the Commentaries). 
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Also known as Pictet’s Commentaries, after their lead editor Jean Pictet,115 the 
Commentaries, together with the 1987 commentary on the Additional Protocols by 
Yves Sandoz et al., have been leading sources of clarification and background on the 
Conventions and Protocols for decades.116  It is difficult to overstate their influential 
and nearly authoritative status.  For instance, despite a clear disclaimer by the ICRC 
to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court recently cited the Commentaries as 
“the official commentaries” to the Geneva Conventions.117  It is reasonable to expect 
that the forthcoming revised Commentaries will enjoy similarly influential and 
revered status as de facto “official” expositions on the ambiguities of the 
Conventions and their Protocols.  At present, no State or collection of like-minded 
State legal advisors appears resolved or resourced to match this ICRC effort.118 
Alongside the work of the ICRC, international criminal tribunals increasingly 
contribute to the development of IHL.119  None has expounded on this body of law 
more actively or profusely than the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).120  More than a criminal adjudicative body, the ICTY has 
enthusiastically embraced a law declaration function.121  Since its earliest cases, the 
ICTY has offered exhaustive elaborations on perennially hazy IHL topics such as the 
threshold of armed conflict, the distinction between international and non-
 
 115.  See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Pictet’s Commentaries, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 495, 497 (Christophe 
Swinarski ed., 1984) (noting that “Pictet’s ‘Commentaries’—as they always are referred to—not only are 
of value because they are accessible; they are reliable”). 
 116.   See Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108, at 1553 (stating that “[o]ver the years, the 
ICRC Commentaries have come to be recognised as essential and well-respected interpretations of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols”). 
 117.   Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).  The Commentaries’ editors were careful to 
observe that 
the Commentary is the personal work of its authors.  The Committee moreover, whenever 
called upon for an opinion on a provision of an international Convention, always takes care to 
emphasize that only the participant States are qualified, through consultation between 
themselves, to give an official and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an intergovernmental 
treaty. 
COMMENTARY:  GC III, supra note 110. 
 118.   See generally Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108. 
 119.   See Jean-Marie Henckaerts,  Response, supra note 38, at 486 (2007) (discussing the contribution 
to IHL from the courts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone). 
 120.   See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law:  How The International Criminal 
Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (stating that “the laws of war had 
developed faster since the beginning of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia than in the forty-five years 
after the Nuremburg Tribunals” (citing Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, War Crimes Law Comes of 
Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463 (1998))); INT’L HUMAN. L. CLINIC, EMORY U. SCH. OF L., OPERATIONAL 
LAW EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE ON THE GOTOVINA JUDGMENT:  MILITARY OPERATIONS, BATTLEFIELD 
REALITY AND THE JUDGMENT’S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 13 (2012) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414 (noting that “[i]ndeed, one of the mandates of the tribunal [ICTY] is the 
progressive development of IHL”). 
 121.   See Danner, supra note 120, at 25–26 (“During the period of the [International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY)] greatest political weakness, its judges issued a surprising series of 
decisions that effected a fundamental transformation in the laws of war.”). 
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international armed conflict, and the range of persons protected by the Geneva 
Conventions.122 
As an example, in Prosecutor v. Gotovina, an ICTY Trial Chamber issued a 
1,377-page judgment that included highly controversial conclusions with respect to 
States’ obligations when conducting attacks.123  Based on those conclusions, the 
Chamber convicted two Croatian generals of war crimes related to artillery 
bombardments of urban areas.124  Among other questionable findings, it concluded 
that shell craters located more than 200 meters from pre-planned military objectives 
in an urban area proved a criminal violation of the IHL principle of distinction.125  
The ICTY’s Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions and rejected many of the 
Trial Chamber’s characterizations of the principle.126  The judgments set off a flurry 
of exchanges between respected IHL commentators concerning the relative merits of 
the Trial and Appeals Chambers’ judgments.127  States, however, were conspicuously 
absent from this important targeting and international criminal law dialogue.128  Even 
States that frequently participate in armed conflict, and that would therefore be 
specially affected by the targeting standards at issue, declined to weigh in officially.129 
This was not always the case.  The ICTY’s early IHL work provoked 
meaningful State involvement.130  For example, in 1995 the U.S. Department of State 
filed an amicus curiae brief in the Tribunal’s first case, Tadić.131  The brief outlined 
 
 122.   See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 68–145 
(Intl’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (describing both when victims become 
protected persons under Art. 2, and when an internal armed conflict reaches the level of international 
armed conflict through the control of armed forces by a foreign power). 
 123.   See ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120, at 4 (“Precisely because it is the only judgment addressing 
complex operational targeting considerations, the Gotovina case has the potential to be a great beacon for 
international law by adding significant definition to the legal paradigm that governs such targeting 
operations . . . . [H]owever, . . . the legal analysis as presently conceived is flawed on multiple levels and 
therefore fails to achieve those goals.”); see generally Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011). 
 124.   Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, para. 2588. 
 125.   Id. para. 1899. 
 126.   Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 83–87 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012). 
 127.   See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT 06-90-A, Application and Proposed Amicus Curiae 
Brief concerning the 15 April 2011 Trial Chamber Judgment and Requesting that the Appeals Chamber 
Reconsider the Findings of Unlawful Artillery Attacks During Operation Storm, Conclusion (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 12, 2012) (“[A]ny judgment that is interpreted as attenuating this 
symmetry risks undermining the efficacy of international humanitarian law and the ultimate humanitarian 
objectives of the law.”); Geoffrey S. Corn & Lt. Col. Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting:  
Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 337, 339 (2012) (discussing the effect 
of Gotovina on the “interrelationship between law and military doctrine”); ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120, 
at 2 (criticizing the “potential flaws in the Trial Chamber’s application of IHL; and . . . potential 
institutional concerns and second-order effects resulting from these flaws”). 
 128.   See generally Corn & Corn, supra note 127; ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120. 
 129.   E.g., Jamila Trindle, Acquitted in Court, Still Blacklisted by the U.S., FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 10, 
2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/10/acquitted-in-court-still-blacklisted-by-the-u-s. 
 130.   See Danner, supra note 120, at 21–22 (noting that the Representative of Venezuela issued a 
report expressing the view that the Tribunal would not be empowered with setting the norms of 
International Law while Canada argued for more specifics in what fell under ICTY jurisdiction). 
 131.   Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments 
Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadić (July 27, 
1995) [hereinafter U.S. Tadić Amicus], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
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U.S. legal views on the threshold of armed conflict, characterization of armed 
conflicts as either IAC or NIAC, availability of the grave breaches enforcement 
regime in NIAC, and nature and content of the laws and customs of war.132  The brief 
continues to serve as a reliable expression of opinio juris.133 Yet, since its filing, the 
United States has not participated meaningfully and substantively in other war 
crimes cases, nor has it offered a similarly thorough or reasoned reaction to a 
judgment of any international criminal tribunal.134  The reasons for this inactivity are 
unclear, but the growing list of States party to the International Criminal Court and 
that Court’s expanding caseload suggest that militarily active States would be well-
advised to engage in the development of IHL through war crimes tribunals, lest they 
find themselves governed on the battlefield by legal norms developed in isolation by 
jurists. 
The IHL advocacy efforts of NGOs are of similarly worthy note.  For instance, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), one of the most sophisticated of NGOs dealing with 
IHL, regularly issues reports on ongoing or recent conflicts.135  The organization also 
takes strong advocacy positions on IHL-related matters.136  An example is its 2013 
Losing Humanity report, which argued, inter alia, that autonomous weapon systems 
are unlawful per se under IHL.137  Although individual scholars protested at such an 
overbroad (and incorrect) statement,138 no State has addressed the various IHL 
matters the organization raised head on.139  Instead, the United States issued a 
Department of Defense Directive that places certain policy limitations on the 
 
65825.pdf. 
 132.   See id. at 27–37 (arguing that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over grave breaches, violations of 
customs of war, and crimes against humanity because the alleged offenses did occur during an 
international armed conflict). 
 133.   See Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris, supra note 27 (observing the brief’s contribution to a “more 
pluralistic, balanced, and active LOAC dialogue”). 
 134.   Id. 
 135.   E.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, TURNING A BLIND EYE:  IMPUNITY FOR LAWS-OF-WAR VIOLATIONS 
DURING THE GAZA WAR (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/89575. 
 136.   See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY:  THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 1–2 
(2012) [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112 ForUpload_0_0.pdf (advocating for a ban on fully 
autonomous weapons); HUM. RTS. WATCH, TIME FOR JUSTICE:  ENDING IMPUNITY FOR KILLINGS AND 
DISAPPEARANCES IN 1990S TURKEY 61–63 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/turkey 0912ForUpload.pdf (recommending further steps the Turkish government needs to take to 
combat impunity in Turkey). 
 137.   LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 136, at 1. 
 138.   See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 387 (2014) (suggesting prohibiting autonomous weapons would be 
“misguided”); Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law:  Advantages, 
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clarified, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 308, 309–10 (2014) 
(contending that an autonomous weapon can reasonable comply with IHL); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Autonomous Weapon Systems:  A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. FEATURES (Feb. 2013) 
at 1–3 (arguing Losing Humanity “obfuscates the on-going legal debate over autonomous weapon 
systems”). 
 139.   See Matthew Waxman & Kenneth Anderson, Don’t Ban Armed Robots in the U.S., NEW 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115229/armed-robots-banning-autonomous-
weapon-systems-isnt-answer (arguing that States should engage in cooperative development of common 
standards and best practices within a law of war framework). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
208 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 50:2 
systems without offering meaningful comment on the relevant legal issues.140  Such 
failure to engage the topic cedes control of the legal discourse to organizations such 
as HRW and the chapeau organization in the campaign against autonomous systems, 
Stop Killer Robots.141 
United Nations bodies have also entered the fray in various instances, including 
appointments by the Human Rights Council of Special Rapporteurs on countering 
terrorism (Mr. Ben Emmerson) and extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 
(Mr. Christof Heyns).142  Both have issued reports on drone operations, including 
IHL issues, marked by a high degree of sophistication and normative detail.143  
Although the United States is actively involved in drone operations, it has issued no 
comprehensive statement on the legal questions surrounding drone strikes.  Instead, 
the government’s limited comments tend to be made, as will be discussed, in 
speeches by senior government officials at academic and professional gatherings or 
found in internal memoranda not intended to be made public.144 
Finally, scholars and other IHL experts have convened and collaborated with 
increasing frequency to produce legal manuals devoted to restating customary and 
treaty IHL, and in many cases clarifying difficulties concerning its application and 
operation.145  Topics covered by these manuals include the law of naval warfare, non-
international armed conflict law, and the law of air and missile warfare.146  Each is 
widely cited in legal literature and has influenced practice in its respective field.147  
 
 140.   See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS (2012), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf (setting broad limitations and 
guidelines regarding the use of autonomous weapons systems). 
 141.   CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2015). 
 142.   See Drone Attacks:  UN Experts Express Concern About the Potential Illegal Use of Armed 
Drones, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS:  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/ NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13905 (explaining involvement 
of Emmerson and Heyns as U.N. Special Rapporteurs and noting their roles).  The most recent mandates 
for the Special Rapporteurs are, respectively, Human Rights Council Res. 22/8, Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism:  Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
22nd Sess., Mar. 21, 2013, A/HRC/RES/22/8 (Apr. 9, 2013), and  Human Rights Council Res. 26/12, 
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 26th Sess., 
June 20, 2014, A/HRC/26/L.23 (June 20, 2014). 
 143.   Emmerson Report, supra note 13, at 5; Heyns Report, supra note 13, at 8. 
 144.   E.g., Harold Honhgu Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and 
International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 
25, 2010) [hereinafter Koh, American Society Remarks], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/ 
remarks/139119.htm. 
 145.   E.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT 
SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN 
POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL]; NIAC MANUAL; see 
also PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., 
COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE 
WARFARE (2010) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL WITH COMMENTARY]. 
 146.   See generally HPCR MANUAL; NIAC MANUAL; SAN REMO MANUAL. 
 147.   See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Current State of the Law of Naval Warfare:  A Fresh 
Look at the San Remo Manual, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 269, 269 (2006) (analyzing the influence of the San 
Remo Manual on current policies and addressing the manual’s shortcomings); see also Symposium:  The 
2009 Air and Missile Warfare Manual:  A Critical Analysis, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 261, 261–379 (2012) 
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And each appears to have responded to concerns that participating experts harbored 
regarding the failure of States to provide legal practitioners sufficiently granular 
guidance on troublesome IHL issues.148  Although these manuals were not intended 
to supplant the role of States in IHL interpretation and development, they are, to a 
degree, having exactly that effect. 
In sum, it is clear that States have not kept pace with an ever-increasing flow of 
non-State international legal commentary; the volume and frequency of the latter 
drowns out what little comment and reaction States have offered.  It is no 
exaggeration to say that jurists, NGOs, scholars and other non-State actors presently 
have greater influence on the interpretation and development of IHL than do States.  
The roles of the respective communities have, unfortunately, been reversed—the 
pluralistic process of formation and development that has long guaranteed the 
efficacy and relevance of IHL is in peril. 
III. THE ROLE OF STATES 
Notwithstanding their recent reserve with respect to opinio juris, States and 
their legal agents still enjoy unique relevance in the formation and interpretation of 
international law generally and IHL in particular.  As the primary authors and 
subjects of IHL, States have authority to actively shape its content and direction, 
through both direct means, such as treaty formation and State practice, and indirect 
means, such as positions proffered in litigation, legal publications, public statements 
of legal intent, and diplomatic communications resorting to law.149 
Even as scholars challenge State-centric understandings of international law, 
near universal respect endures for the special role of sovereigns in the formation of 
international law.150  To co-opt and modify a common observation with respect to 
Originalism in American constitutional interpretation, everyone is a sovereigntist 
sometimes.151  What distinguishes dyed-in-the-wool international law sovereigntists 
from non-sovereigntists is probably not acceptance of the legitimacy of State input, 
but rather attitudes toward non-State actors’ international legal contributions.  Few 
international lawyers contest that State expressions of opinio juris constitute 
legitimate sources of law and a principled form of international legal 
interpretation.152  Disagreements seem instead to concern the effect that absence of 
 
(discussing in detail the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare). 
 148.   HPCR MANUAL foreword; NIAC MANUAL preface; SAN REMO MANUAL introductory note. 
 149.   See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 26 (“[Custom may be] evidenced by such internal matters as 
[States’] domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, internal government memoranda, 
and ministerial statements in Parliaments and elsewhere.”). 
 150.   See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State:  Towards a New Paradigm for 
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 448 (1993) (mentioning the importance of State structure in the 
future development of international law while prognosticating the end of a traditional model of 
sovereignty for States). 
 151.   David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, REC. ONLINE (ALUMNI MAG.) (Fall 2010), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss (“[A]s a matter of rhetoric, everyone is an 
originalist sometimes . . . .”). 
 152.   See Eric Engle, U.N. Packing the State’s Reputation?  A Response to Professor Brewster’s 
“Unpacking the State’s Reputation”, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 34, 37 (2010) (operating under 
the assumption that international law is enforced by states). 
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State opinio juris has on an international norm.153  And while there is surely value in 
the balanced pluralism that results from having both State and non-State 
contributions to the interpretation and development of international law, State input 
has always been singularly significant, particularly when armed conflict is the issue.154  
State opinio juris remains the critical bellwether for the degree of consensus, 
acceptance, and therefore effectiveness and legitimacy of any international legal rule. 
In addition to formal authority, States possess unique competency, facility, and 
access with respect to the contextual ingredients of international law.155  IHL is 
illustrative.  Many commentators grasp the harsh consequences of armed conflict.156  
Yet, few outside the ambit of States’ defense ministries and armed forces fully 
appreciate the operational challenges, demands, and limitations of combat so 
essential to fairly striking the delicate balance between military necessity and 
humanity that infuses IHL and informs its interpretation and evolution.157  Even 
commentators with a military or military legal background can find that their IHL 
experiential base has become dated or passé.158  There is truly no adequate substitute 
for the active input of IHL professionals immersed in States’ current operations and 
legal deliberation. 
The dearth of contextual IHL custom and States’ viewpoints is often 
unavoidable.  States frequently shield their battlefield conduct and decision making 
from public view for rational operational reasons.159  And although they may acquire 
information concerning the practices of adversaries and other States by employing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, that information is 
typically classified and therefore unavailable to non-State actors.  States do regularly 
share some classified information amongst themselves, the paradigmatic examples 
being “five-eyes” sharing160 and the sharing of classified material among NATO 
allies,161 but, because release would reveal certain “sources and methods” of 
 
 153.   See Ross E. Schreiber, Ascertaining Opinio Juris of States Concerning Norms Involving the 
Prevention of International Terrorism:  A Focus on U.N. Process, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 309, 312 (1998) 
(detailing the difficult task of deducing opinio juris). 
 154.   See id. (detailing the particular confusions that arise when trying to deduce international norms 
without State opinio juris, particularly in armed, nuclear conflict). 
 155.   See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law:  A New Approach, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 110 (2010) (bolstering an argument by stating that international law relies on a 
State’s domestic laws and that a State actor’s courts applying the State’s own law is “normatively 
superior”). 
 156.   See, e.g., Ariel Zemach, Taking War Seriously:  Applying the Law of War to Hostilities Within an 
Occupied Territory, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 645, 646–47 (describing the human costs of war in Iraq 
and the Gaza Strip). 
 157.   See id. at 675–76 (assessing the intricacies present in balancing human rights with the demands of 
wartime). 
 158.   See Olivier Bangerter, Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International 
Humanitarian Law or Not, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 353, 370 (2011) (“[I]t is questionable how far 
knowledge of the content of IHL by many commanders and fighters really extends beyond some basic 
notions.”). 
 159.   See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 88–91 (2010) 
(discussing frequency and challenges of State military secrets). 
 160.   See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes–Explainer, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer (delineating the history of the 
five-eyes partnership, involving intelligence sharing between the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand). 
 161.   See generally Alasdair Roberts, Entangling Allies:  NATO’s Security of Information Policy and the 
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collection, non-State actors seldom see such material, for better or worse, except 
when it is leaked.162  The practical effect of this restricted informational environment 
is to stymy non-State efforts to discern State practices, thereby rendering the 
former’s input to the IHL interpretation and development process, through no fault 
of their own, somewhat suspect. 
Additionally, the reluctance of States to express opinio juris on particular topics 
of international law is in some senses understandable.  A number of considerations 
recommend the increasingly prevalent wait-and-see approach.  A State may conclude 
that too little is known about the implications of an emerging area of warfare to 
commit to any particular international regulatory doctrine or regime or to admit 
publicly to the existence of international norms bearing on the matter at all.  It is also 
possible that State reticence is less the product of calculated caution rather than 
political impasse deriving from domestic political considerations.  In many municipal 
legal systems, constitutional and statutory arrangements spread authority over 
international law matters among several agencies and even branches of government, 
frustrating coordination and consensus.163  Interagency friction or disagreement may 
prevent government-level consensus, especially with respect to new or emerging legal 
debates. 
Absence of expressed State opinio juris may even be explained as evidence of 
opinio juris itself.164  In such a case, the State may intend its silence as an implied 
expression of the view that no relevant IHL norm exists.165  Restated, although a 
State may undertake a continuous course of practice on the battlefield, that same 
State may assiduously refrain from accompanying expressions of opinio juris so as to 
preclude any purported crystallization of a customary norm. This might be the case, 
for example, when it imposes self-defense limits on the use of force in rules of 
engagement in situations in which status-based targeting is lawful or when it affords 
treatment to detainees in excess of what IHL would otherwise require. 
On balance, however, the various rationales for State restraint on matters of 
opinio juris are overrated. State silence has not proved effective at stemming IHL’s 
development, which appears to occur with or without active State involvement.166  
Plainly, the failure of States to produce or interpret specific rules of conduct for 
emerging areas of warfare has not counseled silence on the part of non-State legal 
 
Entrenchment of State Secrets, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 329 (2003). 
 162.   See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once:  Higher Care for 
CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1216–18, 1236 (2011) (detailing the relationship between 
the government’s interest in preventing disclosure of sources and methods and the public’s interest 
especially in the judicial context). 
 163.   For example, the U.S. Constitution vests authority over international law to each of the branches 
of the federal government.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (enumerating the U.S. Congress’s power to 
“define and punish offenses against the law of Nations”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Senate advice and 
consent for treaty ratification); id. (enumerating the U.S. President’s power “to make Treaties”); id. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties”). 
 164.   But see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:  THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 437 (2006) (“It is impossible to make any presumptions about the 
opinio juris on the basis of such silence as a matter of general rule.”). 
 165.   Contra id. 
 166.   See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY xlv–xlvi (stating that a state omission or abstention may be 
construed to support opinion juris). 
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actors.167  They have aggressively stepped in to cultivate IHL in response to the 
vacuum left by States.168  Rather than preserve operational and legal flexibility, State 
silence may simply cede significant initiative and power over IHL to non-State 
actors. 
Two international legal controversies demonstrate how State delay, ambiguity, 
or silence with respect to opinio juris risks the imposition of very real costs.  Soon 
after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States 
launched military operations in Afghanistan “in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States.”169 U.S. armed forces soon 
captured individuals believed to be affiliated with al Qaeda or organizations that 
were said to have supported or harbored al Qaeda, such as Afghanistan’s de facto 
Taliban government.170  By early 2002, U.S. armed forces and intelligence agencies 
had transferred over 150 suspected high-level leaders or valuable fighters to the U.S. 
military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.171 
Questions concerning the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees quickly 
arose.172  Some speculated the detainees might qualify as prisoners of war, entitled to 
the protections of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.173 Others contended that 
both al-Qaeda and Taliban members were extra-legal persons and unlawful 
combatants, entitled to no specific international legal protections.174  The U.S. 
government did little to quell or resolve debate.175  Its public position on the matter 
was vague, especially as to the underlying legal reasoning upon which its actions were 
purportedly based.176 
This is not to say the government had ignored the issue of the detainees’ 
international legal status. As public and political debate swirled, a parallel, albeit 
cloistered, legal debate took place within and between several U.S. executive branch 
agencies.177  The various positions broadly emulated those that had surfaced in public 
 
 167.   See supra Part II. 
 168.   Id. 
 169.   Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
 170.   See 1 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOLUME I:  MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11 SEPTEMBER 2001–1 MAY 
2003), at 53 (2004) (describing legal issues concerning enemy personnel detained in Afghanistan in late 
2001). 
 171.   See Katharine Q. Seelye, Troops Arrive at Base in Cuba to Build Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/us/a-nation-challenged-the-prisoners-troops-arrive-at-base-in-cuba-to-
build-jails.html (detailing the number of prisoners present in Cuba in 2002 as over 300). 
 172.   Bryan Bender, Red Cross Disputes US Stance on Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2002, at Al 
[hereinafter U.S. Stance]; Agency Differs with U.S. over P.O.W.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/09/international/09DETA.html. 
 173.   Bender, supra note 172, at A1. 
 174.   E.g., Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L.  475, 476–77 (2002). 
 175.   See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in A Time of Emergency:  States of Exception and the Temptations 
of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1030–34 (2004) (describing the ways in which the Bush Administration 
approached handling the legal status of terrorists captured and detained post-9/11). 
 176.   Id. 
 177.   See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].  The Papers are a compilation of dozens 
of U.S. government legal memoranda and investigations related to detainee policies in the Global War on 
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debate within the broader legal community.178  However, at the time, the government 
neither publically proffered a comprehensively-reasoned legal analysis of its 
detention policy, nor provided any clear statement setting forth its views on U.S. 
legal obligations regarding the Guantanamo detainees’ status and treatment.179 
In early 2002, President Bush ultimately settled the internal executive branch 
debate on the detainees’ legal status.180  However, the full legal bases for the 
government’s ultimate position remained classified.181  The Bush administration 
appeared satisfied to justify its determinations of the detainees’ legal status with 
short summary fact sheets.182  In fact, the full legal reasoning analyzing the detainees’ 
status was never made public through any officially approved expression of opinio 
juris—it was instead leaked.183  As the unauthorized release of photos depicting 
prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib military detention facility in Iraq took place in 
April 2004,184 news outlets also began to receive and publish leaked copies of 
executive branch legal documents and memoranda addressing the Guantanamo 
detainees’ legal status and the justifications for their indefinite detention.185  The 
leaked memoranda fueled intense debate, litigation, and resentment, both in the 
United States and abroad.186  They also inspired international lawyers to aggressively 
rebut the legal reasoning contained therein.187  The U.S. executive branch quickly 
lost the initiative regarding characterization of the detainees’ status under IHL to the 
judicial branch, Congress, and even the non-State international law community. 
To be sure, not all of the negative fallout of the affair is attributable to absence 
of effective opinio juris.  Substantive deficiencies in the legal analyses of the 
 
Terrorism. See generally id. 
 178.   Id. 
 179.   See Murphy, supra note 174, at 477 (describing the Bush administration’s changing stance on the 
status and treatment of Guantanamo detainees under the Geneva Convention). 
 180.   Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Vice President, et al., Humane Treatment of 
Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Memo. from President Bush], available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In 
Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/02/08/world/nation-challenged-captives-shift-bush-says-geneva-rules-fit-taliban-captives.html 
(reporting that the decision to apply of the Geneva Convention to Taliban captives ended an “internal 
legal debate”). 
 181.   A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
 182.   Fact Sheet, White House Press Office, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79402; see also, Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD 
News Briefing:  Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (demonstrating Secretary Rumsfeld’s failure to expand on 
the Administration’s reasoning when questioned). 
 183.   Memo. from President Bush, supra note 180. 
 184.   See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (breaking the story of prisoner 
abuse by military personnel). 
 185.   See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 177. 
 186.   See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The Bush Administration and The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
Torture Memos:  A Content Analysis of the Response in the Academic Legal Community, 11 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 11–12, 6–26 (2012) (discussing the academic community’s moral 
indignation). 
 187.   Id. at 6. 
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memoranda supporting the policies are chiefly to blame.188  The marginalization of 
seasoned professional legal expertise within the executive branch likewise 
contributed.189  Yet, a more vigorous and public approach to opinio juris could have 
prevented much of the costly fallout.  If U.S. executive branch officials felt it 
necessary to abandon long-settled principles with respect to the classification and 
treatment of persons detained in armed conflict, an active and public campaign of 
timely and tightly-reasoned opinio juris would surely have been a more effective way 
to develop international norms better suited to the modern security needs of States 
than secretive, unilaterally constructed memoranda.  If the laws-of-war were indeed 
“quaint” and “obsolete” in some respects,190 a carefully managed campaign of opinio 
juris that marshaled the full expertise and resources of the U.S. government’s legal 
community would surely have proved more successful in updating them in both the 
long and short term. 
The expanding use of drones to target terrorists outside active theaters of 
combat operations is a second instance where the United States appears to prefer to 
operate under a shroud of legal ambiguity.191  These operations raise questions from 
an array of legal regimes—the jus ad bellum, sovereignty, human rights, and IHL.192  
With respect to IHL, the core issues are 1) whether the drone operations are being 
mounted as an aspect of an “armed conflict” such that IHL applies and, if so, 2) 
whether the individuals attacked qualify as lawful targets, and 3) whether the 
operations comply with IHL rule of proportionality and the requirement to take 
precautions in attack.193 
There is no question that the admixture of normative regimes renders linear and 
compartmentalized legal analysis of the drone program challenging.194  Indeed, much 
of the discussion to date has misstated the law and conflated separate and distinct 
legal regimes.195  It is a discourse that has been marked by emotive assertions as 
much as by legal acumen.196  However, non-State actors have lately started to 
 
 188.   Id. at 6–7. 
 189.   See, e.g., Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or “Extra-
Conventional Persons”:  How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary 
Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 681, 682–83 (2005) (discussing 
the role of judge advocates in giving legal advice to the ranking commander in Iraq at the time of the Abu 
Ghraib detainee abuses). 
 190.   Draft Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George W. Bush, 
Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and 
the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 177, at 118. 
 191.   CIVILIAN COST, supra note 56, at 80–81. 
 192.   Id. at 26, 80–83; Rotem Giladi, The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the Law of 
Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 246, 246–47 (2008) (“Every . . . practitioner of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) is familiar with the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello (or IHL).  Both are public 
international law regimes that regulate war but whereas the former regulates the legality of the use of 
force per se, the latter concerns the legality of the manner in which force is used.  The distinction generally 
means that the rules of jus in bello apply irrespective of questions of legality under jus ad bellum and that, 
as a consequence, all belligerents are subject to the same rules of jus in bello, whatever their position 
under jus ad bellum.”). 
 193.   AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 14–24. 
 194.   See generally Michael Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law Divide:  The Drone Debate 
Matures, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter Schmitt, Drone Debate]. 
 195.   Id. at 3–9. 
 196.   Id. 
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produce analyses that are sophisticated and convincing.197  Noteworthy in this regard 
are recent reports by HRW, Amnesty International, and the two U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs, all of which, appropriately so, have garnered significant attention in the 
international law community.198 
Yet to date, the government, under two very different administrations, has 
offered no thorough expression of opinio juris that draws together the various legal 
strands in a manner that would convincingly justify the strikes as a matter of 
international law.199  Instead, both administrations have resorted to periodic speeches 
by senior officials who provide only vague glimpses of the U.S. position.200 
Most often cited is a speech by former Department of State Legal Adviser 
Harold Koh at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law.201  Although heralded at the time as the first full explanation of U.S. legal 
policy on drone strikes, for experts in the field it was a rather confusing 
explication.202  For instance, it was unclear whether the use of force against members 
of al Qaeda was being justified on the basis of the law of self-defense (a jus ad bellum 
issue), because of U.S. involvement in an armed conflict with the organization (an 
IHL issue), or on account of both.203  The speech was likewise unexceptional.  An 
announcement that the United States complies with the principle of distinction and 
the rule of proportionality hardly constitutes an epiphany.204  Failure to comply 
would not only violate IHL, but also amount to a war crime by those involved.205  
And curiously, there is no mention of the requirement to take precautions in attack, 
which is central to the legality of drone strikes under IHL.206 
 
 197.   See id. at 12–13 (describing analysis and comparison of prominent recent reports) 
 198.   See generally Emmerson Report, supra note 13; Heyns Report, supra note 13; CIVILIAN COST, 
supra note 56; AMNESTY INT’L, “WILL I BE NEXT?”:  US DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN (2013) 
[hereinafter DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN].  For an analysis of the four reports, see generally Schmitt, 
Drone Debate, supra note 194. 
 199.   See, e.g., DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, supra note 198, at 49 (describing the refusal of the 
United States to provide public access to information about its drone program in Pakistan). 
 200.   See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the London School 
of Economics:  Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bellinger, War on 
Terrorism], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm (describing the U.S. views on the 
detention and treatment of terrorists since 9/11). 
 201.   Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144. 
 202.   See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUM. RTS. INST., TARGETING OPERATIONS WITH DRONE 
TECHNOLOGY:  HUMANITARIAN LAW IMPLICATIONS 2 (2011) (discussing former Department of State 
Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s explanation of U.S. legal policy on drone strikes and the legality of U.S. 
practice). 
 203.   Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7.  Adviser Harold Koh stated, “[a]s I have 
explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well 
as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent 
with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.”  Id. 
 204.   Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7–8. 
 205.   See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 1, 14, 156 (discussing the principle of distinction between 
civilians and combatants, proportionality in attack, and definition of war crimes, respectively). 
 206.   See generally Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (lacking discussion of drone 
precautionary measures); see also ICRC Challenges, supra note 35, at 38–39 (discussing required 
precautions under IHL and its application to drone attacks). 
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Other noteworthy speeches include those by Koh’s predecessor, John Bellinger, 
at the London School of Economics;207 John Brennan at Harvard Law School while 
he was serving as the President’s Assistant for Counterterrorism;208 Attorney 
General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law;209 former Defense 
Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson at Yale Law School;210 and the President 
himself at National Defense University.211  A brief Fact Sheet was released by the 
White House contemporaneously with the President’s speech.212  Each of these 
addressed particular aspects of IHL and other bodies of law governing drone 
operations, but none offered an analysis robust enough to draw any but the broadest 
of conclusions as to the U.S. view of the applicable law.213  Moreover, the speeches 
not only failed to clearly distinguish the various legal regimes from which the 
relevant law derives, but left it uncertain whether the positions taken were the 
product of legal, operational, moral, or policy concerns.  Paradoxically, the most 
comprehensive analysis by the government of the international law issues 
surrounding drone operations was that offered in an unsigned and undated draft 
Justice Department White Paper that was leaked to the press in 2013, hardly an 
exemplar of reliable opinio juris.214 
The vacuity of recent opinio juris is particularly surprising given the fact that the 
law of drone operations is exceedingly emotive and has underpinned widespread and 
impassioned condemnation of the United States as a “might makes right” State.215  
As a matter of law, the basis for the U.S. operations is arguably sound.216  
Articulating that basis publicly would not only have the immediate effect of 
tempering the criticism (much of which is levied on the basis of a lack of legal 
 
 207.   Bellinger, War on Terrorism, supra note 200. 
 208.   John O. Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening 
Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at 
Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. 
 209.   Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
 210.   Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and 
Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Address at the Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 
2012), in 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 141 (2012). 
 211.   President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university. 
 212.   Fact Sheet:  The President’s May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism, White House Press Office 
(May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-
speech-counterterrorism. 
 213.   See generally id.; Bellinger, War on Terrorism, supra note 200; Brennan, supra note 208; Holder, 
supra note 209; Johnson, supra note 210; Obama, supra note 211. 
 214.   See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. 
Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force (Leaked Draft White 
Paper Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/ 
msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
 215.   See generally CIVILIAN COST, supra note 56 (detailing the civilian casualties of U.S. drone policy 
and recommending changes). 
 216.   See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting:  Deconstructing the Logic of 
International Law, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77 (2013). 
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transparency217), but also help preserve the option of conducting drone operations 
extraterritorially in the future. 
Whatever the reason for the U.S. failure to issue an unambiguous expression of 
opinio juris, by now the United States and other countries that conduct such 
operations have lost control of the debate.  Non-State actors are shaping the 
discussion as they wish, with States merely responding, or more often not responding 
at all, to the sundry objections they raise.218  From this reactive stance, it is nearly 
impossible for States conducting drone strikes to muster sufficient support from 
other States to redirect the debate.  The domestic political costs of supporting the 
strikes (at least those outside an active battlefield) are simply too high for them.219  
Additionally, the United States has not provided an adequately detailed and 
reasoned delineation of its legal position that could be assessed and embraced by 
other States.220  To employ military terminology, the drone debate and many other 
currently debated IHL issues are, for the United States especially, “self-inflicted 
wounds.” 
Perhaps the most pressing need for an expression of opinio juris is with respect 
to those articles of AP I the United States believes accurately reflect customary 
law—and those it does not. The instrument was designed to supplement the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions, which dealt primarily with protections for specified 
persons and objects.221  Rules regarding how combat was to occur were the province 
of the 1907 Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV.222  Although a post-
World War II tribunal at Nuremberg found that it reflected customary law,223 the 
treaty was sparse and clearly in need of expansion in the aftermath of two world wars 
and numerous post-World War II conflicts such as those in Algeria and Vietnam.224  
AP I, addressed to international armed conflict, was intended to serve that process.225  
 
 217.   See, e.g., Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to President Barack Obama (Dec. 
4, 2013) [hereinafter Letter to President Obama], available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/12/2013-12-04-Coalition-Follow-Up-Letter-to-Obama-on-TK.pdf (calling on the government to 
“publicly disclose key targeted killing standards and criteria”); MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65:  REFORMING U.S. DRONE STRIKE POLICIES 3 (2013) 
(stating that the “lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of 
armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework”); Heyns Report, supra note 13, at 21 
(emphasizing to the U.N. the need for greater transparency regarding drone policy for all states). 
 218.   See, e.g., Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7–8 (responding to criticisms against 
U.S. targeting practices); Letter to President Obama, supra note 217 (noting President Obama’s stated 
intention to limit the use of lethal force). 
 219.   See ANTHONY DWORKIN, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DRONES AND 
TARGETED KILLING:  DEFINING A EUROPEAN POSITION 2–4 (2013) (discussing domestic opposition to 
drone strikes among E.U. member States). 
 220.   See Letter to President Obama, supra note 217 (asking for a clearer standard for drone strikes); 
ZENKO, supra note 217, at 16–17 (noting that the United States has offered multiple legal justifications for 
drone strikes). 
 221.   AP I art. 1(3). 
 222.   Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. 
 223.   United States v. von Leeb et al. [High Command Trial], 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 532 (1950). 
 224.   See George Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 764, 764 (1981) (noting that 
the Additional Protocols were created to address the deficiencies in the Geneva Conventions). 
 225.   Id. 
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In the ensuing two and a half decades, the United States has remained a non-Party.226  
Still, 174 States are Party to the Protocol, including most NATO allies and States 
with which the United States frequently operates militarily, such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia.227 
To date, the United States has issued no comprehensive expression of opinio 
juris regarding those provisions of AP I it regards as reflecting customary 
international law.228  Although it is clear from U.S. practice, training, and doctrine 
that certain key provisions, such as the proportionality aspects of Articles 51 and 57, 
are accepted as customary,229 little is known beyond that.  For instance, does the 
United States accept the definition of perfidy only with the exclusion of the reference 
to “capture,” as is sometimes asserted?230  Does it continue to take the position that 
the provisions on the environment do not reflect customary law?  Is the U.S. position 
on military objectives that “war-sustaining” objects are included, as appears to be the 
case from the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard manual, but which has been 
criticized as a distortion of the law?231  What is the current U.S. position regarding 
combatant status for those members of a militia group belonging to a Party to the 
conflict, but who do not wear distinguishing attire or symbols when conducting an 
attack?232 
When trying to discern the U.S. legal position with respect to these and other 
unsettled issues, scholars and practitioners turn to three sources.  The first two are 
internal Department of Defense memoranda, one to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,233 the other to an Assistant General Counsel.234  Both cover the same 
ground and are distinguished by their brevity and restatement of the obvious.235  The 
third is a speech by the then Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department at an 
academic conference in 1987 that was reprinted in the American University Journal 
 
 226.   Treaties and States Party to Such Treaties:  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 
1977, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties 
&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter ICRC Additional Protocol Parties]. 
 227.   Id. 
 228.   See generally Theodor Meron et al., Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions for Protection of War Victims:  Future Directions in Light of the U.S. Decision Not to Ratify, 
Panel Discussion, in 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 26 (1987). 
 229.   Cf. Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (discussing the rigorous implementation of 
proportionality and distinction throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations in the Obama 
Administration). 
 230.   See AP I art. 37 (stating the prohibition of perfidy elements). 
 231.   NWP 1-14M, supra note 55, para. 8.2; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 95–96 (2d ed. 2010). 
 232.   See AP I art. 44 (reciting the rule under the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions). 
 233.   Memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Protocols I and II–Humanitarian 
Law during Armed Conflict, Office of the Ass’t Sec’y of Def., (Nov. 7, 1977) [hereinafter Memorandum to 
the Chairman] (on file with author). 
 234.   Memorandum from W. Hays Parks et al. to Mr. John H. McNeill, Ass’t Gen. Counsel, Office of 
the Sec’y of Def. (May 9, 1986), in U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 234–35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014) [hereinafter 
Memorandum to John H. McNeil]. 
 235.   Compare Memorandum to the Chairman, supra note 233, with Memorandum to John H. McNeil, 
supra note 234, at 234-35 (listing the provisions of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions that were already part of customary international law). 
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of International Law and Policy.236  To provide guidance to its judge advocates, the 
U.S. Army has reprinted the second memorandum and a summary of the article in its 
current 2014 Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement.237 
This lack of opinio juris is problematic.  U.S. forces have been at war over a 
decade with little official guidance as to those aspects of AP I, the most 
comprehensive conduct of hostilities treaty, the United States believes are customary 
in nature.238  Moreover, in both of its major conflicts, U.S. troops operated alongside 
forces subject to the Protocol and in many cases commanded those troops in combat, 
thereby raising important questions of legal interoperability.239 
Finally, especially illustrative of the U.S. reluctance to set forth its IHL 
positions openly is the tortured process to produce a Department of Defense (DoD) 
Law of War Manual.240  Although military manuals are not themselves expressions of 
opinio juris because they are often based in part on operational and policy concerns, 
they serve as useful evidence thereof.241  Presently, the Army Manual dates from 
1956,242 the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual is a 2007 product,243 and the 
Air Force no longer has a manual in force.244  In 1996, the Army Judge Advocate 
General’s sensible proposal that a manual be produced for all four DoD services was 
accepted.245  It took nearly a decade and a half to produce a draft,246 a particularly 
 
 236.  Matheson, supra note 67; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Remarks on the Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 460, 467–68 (1987) (discussing why the Joint Chiefs of Staff found AP I to be 
“militarily unacceptable”). 
 237.   U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 232–35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014). 
 238.   See Cadwalader, supra note 65, at 135 (“Unfortunately, there is no single authoritative reference 
detailing those provisions of AP I the US accepts as an accurate restatement of customary international 
law or other legal obligations, or that it follows as a matter of policy during armed conflict.”). 
 239.   The U.S. has not ratified AP I, but many States that have assisted the U.S. in armed conflicts over 
the past decade have ratified AP I.  ICRC Additional Protocol Parties, supra note 226. 
 240.   See W. Hays Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, Address before the American Bar 
Association Standing Committee on National Security, at 6 (Nov. 30 2012) [hereinafter Parks, Update on 
the DOD Law of War Manual], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ 
Parks.Manual.pdf (detailing the failure of the 2010 draft of the manual); Robert Chesney, Hays Parks on 
the Demise of the DOD War Manual, LAWFARE (Dec. 8 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/hays-
parks-on-the-demise-of-the-dod-law-of-war-manual/ (“The effort to publish that manual now appears to 
be dead in the water, for better or worse, and the speech Hays gave at last week’s meeting is something of 
a post-mortem providing his view as to why things stalled.”); Edwin Williamson & Hays Parks, Where is 
the Law of War Manual?, 18 WKLY. STANDARD (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/where-law-war-manual_739267.html?nopager=1 (discussing both 
the fourteen year process of drafting the manual as well as the sudden thirty month delay in approving the 
manual); Cadwalader, supra note 65, at 156 (stating that “the author of this paper has been informed that 
the Manual remains under review and its release date is uncertain”). 
 241.   See Cadwalader, supra note 65, at 160–68 (interpreting AP I in light of the Army Field Manual 
and the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual). 
 242.   DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10:  THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) [hereinafter 
FM 27-10]. 
 243.   See generally NWP 1-14M, supra note 55. 
 244.   The Air Force manual has been rescinded.  DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., 
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1980). 
 245.   Williamson & Parks, supra note 240. 
 246.   See id. (remarking that the Department of Defense (DoD) working group spent fourteen years to 
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unfortunate pace given that two major wars replete with extraordinarily complex 
legal issues were underway for much of the period.  Acceptance of the draft appears 
to have become the victim of interagency disagreement.247 
As a result, the Army operates armed with a manual that is 58 years old and the 
Air Force “flies and fights” without any comprehensive published legal guidance.248  
In the absence of formal guidance, U.S. forces are sometimes forced to train, 
operate, and render legal advice based on documents issued by non-State actors, 
including some of those mentioned supra.249  The situation is regrettable not only for 
its failure to support serving military lawyers and commanders, but also as yet 
another example of U.S. retreat from active IHL opinio juris. 
IV. CYBER OPINIO JURIS 
Clearly, the absence of authoritative State opinio juris impoverishes IHL 
discussions, debates, and deliberations, both descriptive and normative.  Whatever 
one’s opinion of the substantive quality or correctness of a State’s particular 
expression of opinio juris, State legal opinions provide indispensable control samples 
for meaningful analysis and critique.  The efforts of, inter alia, legal practitioners, 
judges, government legal advisers, scholars, commanders, humanitarian workers, 
members of the media, and policy makers inexorably suffer when States fail to clarify 
and update their views on the content, interpretation, and future direction of IHL. 
The question is, of course, whether the unfortunate tendency of States to shy 
away from expressions of opinio juris will continue to plague IHL?  It is a question of 
seminal importance in light of new forms and means of warfare.  Of these, the 
emergence of cyberspace as a pervasive aspect of conflict250 presents the most 
pressing demand for opinio juris.  Indeed, States’ armed forces have been quick to 
embrace cyberspace as a domain of military operations.251 
 
produce the first draft of the manual). 
 247.   See id. (explaining major policy disagreements among Departments of State, Justice, and 
Defense); see also Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, supra note 240 (indicating consensus 
of the agencies involved after the first draft of the manual was produced in 2010 has since ended).  But see 
Letter from Robert S. Taylor, Acting General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. to Editor of The Weekly Standard 
(July 18, 2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Letter-to-The-
Weekly-Standard _18Jul2013.pdf (responding to the Williamson and Parks article supra note 240 and 
emphasizing that experts are still working cooperatively and diligently to produce the final version of the 
manual). 
 248.   See FM 27-10, supra note 242 (dating from July 1956); see DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 
244 (noting the Army Manual was written in 1956 and the Air Force manual has been rescinded). 
 249.   E.g., Emmerson Report, supra note 13. 
 250.   See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 2–4 (J2011) 
[hereinafter STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf  (describing various threats and potential vulnerabilities 
posed by malicious cyber attacks that could affect military, public, and private interests); JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3–13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS vii (2012), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf [hereinafter INFORMATION OPERATIONS] (“The 
nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and 
will use information-related capabilities . . . to gain advantages in the information environment, just as 
they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational 
environments.”). 
 251.   See, e.g., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 250, at 5 (“Though the 
networks and systems that make up cyberspace are man-made, often privately owned, and primarily 
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Cyber operations began to capture the attention of the international legal 
community in the 1990s.252  However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
refocused attention on the law of counterterrorism and the law governing the 
counterinsurgency operations that came to characterize the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.253  It was not until the massive cyber operations directed against Estonia in 
2007, following that State’s movement of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the 
“Great Patriotic War,”254 and the use of such operations during the international 
armed conflict between Russia and Georgia the following year,255 that the legal 
community began examining the topic of cyber law again.256 
Initially, there was disagreement whether IHL applied at all to cyber operations 
given their non-kinetic nature.257  Assertions of non-applicability, however, fly in the 
face of the object and purpose of IHL. For instance, Article 36 of AP I mandates a 
review of new methods and means of warfare prior to their use.258  The requirement 
to review new means (weapons) is generally deemed to reflect customary law.259  
And, as recently acknowledged by the “Group of Governmental Experts” 
representing fifteen countries convened by the U.N. General Assembly, international 
law applies to cyber activities.260  There is quite simply no cogent reason to exclude 
IHL from the ambit of applicable international law.261 
Although a majority of States, including the United States, appears to regard 
the existing IHL as the primary source of duties and obligations during cyber 
conflict,262 no comprehensive treaty regime as of yet specifically regulates such 
 
civilian in use, treating cyberspace as a domain is a critical organizing concept for DoD’s national security 
missions.  This allows DoD to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and 
space to support national security interests.”); see generally INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra note 250. 
 252.   The first conference on the subject was held at the U.S. Naval War College in 1999.  See generally 
Computer Network Attack and International Law, 76 INT’L L. STUD. intro. (2002). 
 253.   See, e.g., Bellinger, War on Terrorism, supra note 200 (discussing changes in counterterrorism law 
and policy in the War on Terrorism since September 11, 2001). 
 254.   See, e.g., ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL 
CYBER INCIDENTS:  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 15, 18–20 (2010), available at 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf (providing a history and overview of the 
2007 cyber attacks on Estonia). 
 255.   Id. at 67–79. 
 256.   Id. at 79. 
 257.   See, e.g., id. at 79–86 (discussing the applicability of international law to the Georgia conflict). 
 258.   AP I art. 36. 
 259.   See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE r. 48 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (identifying a review requirement as 
customary international law).  Although some States do not acknowledge the customary nature of the 
norm vis-à-vis methods of warfare, this minor deviation from the text of Article 36 has little bearing on the 
general applicability of IHL to cyber operations. 
 260.   U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Rep., transmitted by the Secretary-General, 
para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).  The experts came from Argentina, Australia, Belarus, 
Canada, China, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 261.   The ICRC has taken this view, as did the Tallinn Manual International Group of Experts. ICRC 
Challenges, supra note 35, at 36–38; TALLINN MANUAL r. 22. 
 262.   See, e.g., Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (stating that international law applies 
to cyberspace).  The Netherlands has likewise acknowledged that IHL applies in cyberspace. GOV’T OF 
THE NETH., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE AIV/CAVV REPORT ON CYBER WARFARE 5 (2012). 
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situations.263  There appears to be no political stomach on the part of States for 
adopting such treaties in the foreseeable future.  As a result, the main focus of legal 
activity will inevitably be on interpreting existing international law in the context of 
cyber operations; for IHL, this means determining when cyber operations rise to the 
level of an armed conflict if unaccompanied by kinetic operations264 and ascertaining 
how extant IHL principles and rules designed for a kinetic environment apply to 
cyber operations.265 
Continuing the trend discussed supra, States have offered no granular 
expressions of opinio juris on the subject.  On the contrary, elucidation of the 
particulars and details of the purported international regulation of cyber hostilities 
has been left almost entirely to non-State legal conjecture.  The emergence of 
cyberspace seems to have captured the attention of IHL scholars, and those 
concerned with the use of force under jus ad bellum, to a greater extent than any 
other community of international legal commentators.  A growing body of 
scholarship on a broad range of IHL cyber issues now exists, the most significant of 
which is the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare.266 
Produced by an International Group of Experts (IGE) invited by the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the Tallinn Manual 
identifies 95 customary international law rules of jus ad bellum and IHL and includes 
an extensive commentary that captures majority and minority viewpoints on their 
interpretation.267  The experts included academics, former senior military lawyers, 
and former NGO legal advisors, as well as non-voting observers from the ICRC, U.S. 
Cyber Command, and NATO.268  While the process relied upon the logistical and 
financial support of the CCD COE, the manual itself was not a NATO product.269  
Its rules reflect only the views of the IGE, the members of which were all 
participating in their personal capacity.270  On many topics of relevance to cyber 
warfare, the Tallinn Manual provides the most extensive and thorough legal analysis 
currently available.271 
 
 263.   Mark A. Kochuk, Symposium Review:  Is There A Need for International Cyber Warfare 
Treaties?, N. C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://blogs.law.unc.edu/ncilj/2014/02/13/symposium-review-is-there-a-need-for-international-cyber-
warfare-treaties/. 
 264.   JEREMY A. RABKIN & ARIEL RABKIN, HOOVER INST. STANFORD UNIV., TO CONFRONT CYBER 
THREATS, WE MUST RETHINK THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3–6 (2012), available at 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/inline/docs/EmergingThreats_Rabkin.pdf. 
 265.   Id. at 6. 
 266.  See generally TALLINN MANUAL.  The authors were both members of the International Group of 
Experts that produced the Manual. 
 267.   See generally id. 
 268.   Id. Int’l Grp. of Experts. 
 269.   Id. intro. 
 270.   Id. 
 271.   See Liis Vihul & Michael N. Schmitt, The Tallinn Manual on Cyber Warfare–A First Tool for 
Legal Practitioners, FIFTEENEIGHTYFOUR (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2013/11/the-
tallinn-manual-on-cyber-warfare-a-first-tool-for-legal-practitioners-michael-schmitt-liis-vihul-nato/ 
[hereinafter Vihul & Schmitt, First Tool for Legal Practitioners] (recognizing the Tallinn Manual as the 
first detailed look at the law applicable to hostile cyber operations). 
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The Tallinn Manual has been cited widely in academic literature and at 
conferences.272  Anecdotally, State reactions to it have been largely positive.273  But 
no State has commented on the Manual’s conclusions in any comprehensive or 
definitive manner, nor has any State or group of States produced an analogous or 
competing product.  And although the vast majority of the Tallinn Manual’s 
statements of law and commentary appear consistent with what little is known of 
State views on the application of IHL to cyber warfare, actual State expressions of 
opinio juris on the topics it addresses remain exceedingly vague.274  For instance, 
shortly before publication, former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh 
delivered remarks on the applicability of international law to cyber operations.275  
They included a firm commitment to apply existing IHL to situations of armed 
conflict involving cyber activities.276  But Koh failed to stake out clear or 
comprehensive positions with respect to most of the thorny legal issues identified in 
the Tallinn Manual.277  The remarks drew attention since they were the first foray 
into the subject,278 but they did little more than state the obvious. 
There are, of course, colorable reasons for State reticence to set forth views on 
how IHL applies to cyber operations.  To begin with, legal ambiguity may benefit 
States by affording them greater leeway to conduct and respond to cyber operations 
during an armed conflict.279  Moreover, at this nascent stage in the development of 
cyber capabilities and threats, States may be conflicted as to the optimal position to 
take when interpreting existing law.280  To illustrate, the United States is especially 
vulnerable to cyber operations due to the pervasive reliance of its armed forces on 
computers and computer networks, as well as the dependency of its civilian activities 
on cyber activities and infrastructure.281  Yet, the country’s armed forces also wield 
impressive cyber capabilities, as exemplified by the establishment of U.S. Cyber 
Command and its service components, which it can bring to bear on enemy forces.282  
 
 272.   See, e.g., the forum on the Tallinn Manual, in 15 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. L. 3–58 (2012); Dieter Fleck, 
Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare—A Critical First Assessment of the New 
Tallinn Manual, 18 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 331 (2013). 
 273.   Vihul & Schmitt, First Tool for Legal Practitioners, supra note 271. 
 274.   See generally Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (discussing the U.S. Government’s 
views on international law and cyber warfare). 
 275.   Id. 
 276.   Id. 
 277.   See generally Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace:  The Koh Speech and Tallinn 
Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 13, 15 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitt, Speech and Manual 
Juxtaposed] (providing “analytical granularity as to the legal basis for the positions proffered in the Koh 
Speech”). 
 278.   Ellen Nakashima, Cyberattacks Could Trigger Self-Defense Rule, U.S. Official Says, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 18, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-official-says-cyberattacks-can-trigger-
self-defense-rule/2012/09/18/c2246c1a-0202-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html. 
 279.   See Schmitt, Rewired Warfare, supra note 25, at 2, 4–7 (explaining that the permissive approach to 
applying IHL to cyber operations allows for a wider range of cyber operations against the civilian 
population). 
 280.   See id. at 2–3 (explaining the three different approaches used in interpreting how to apply IHL to 
cyber operations:  permissive, restrictive, and the Tallinn Manual’s new approach). 
 281.   Michael Assante, America’s Critical Infrastructure Is Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks, FORBES (Sept. 
11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/11/11/americas-critical-infrastructure-is-vulnerable-to-
cyber-attacks/. 
 282.   Schmitt, Rewired Warfare, supra note 25, at 2. 
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The United States resultantly finds itself on the horns of a dilemma.  A normatively 
permissive regime would place its military operations and civilian population at risk, 
but empower it to conduct aggressive cyber activities; a restrictive regime would 
confine its military options, but likewise limit the enemy’s ability to exploit its cyber 
vulnerabilities or target its civilian population.  Justified or not, the hesitancy of 
States to offer expressions of opinio juris on the law of cyber warfare has become 
palpable. 
While States may not be prepared to comment expansively or with any degree 
of precision on how they believe IHL governs cyber operations, a number of key 
topics are plainly ripe for expressions of opinio juris.  With debate over these topics 
in the academy and the NGO community maturing, States risk forfeiting the 
opportunity to shape the future legal environment of this “fifth domain” of 
warfare.283  A sampling of four of the more contentious topics illustrates the 
importance of proactively engaging in their normative development. 
First, the threshold question regarding the applicability of any IHL principle or 
rule is always whether a state of armed conflict exists, and, if so, whether that conflict 
is international or non-international in character.284  Should an armed conflict not 
exist, human rights and domestic law will govern any forceful cyber operations that 
are mounted, not IHL.285  These latter bodies of law do not countenance “attacks” (a 
term discussed infra) based on the status of the target (e.g., combatant, civilian direct 
participant in hostilities, military objective); there is accordingly no “belligerent 
immunity” for attacking lawful targets, as there would be during an armed conflict.286  
Therefore, absent an armed conflict, cyber operations likely to cause direct or 
indirect physical harm may only lawfully be launched in self-defense, defense of 
others, or other situations allowing the use of force; in other words, cyber operations 
may be conducted only pursuant to a “law enforcement” legal regime.287 
Of course, to the extent that kinetic hostilities qualify a conflict as international 
or non-international, IHL applicable in each of these two forms of armed conflict 
would apply to associated cyber operations.288  The problematic question is instead 
whether a cyber exchange that includes no kinetic component can qualify as armed 
conflict, thereby opening the door to IHL.  International armed conflict requires that 
there be “hostilities” between two or more States.289  Although there are differences 
 
 283.   See DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 37 (2010), available at 
http://www.defense. gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdf (listing cyberspace as a relevant 
domain for the DoD along with “land, sea, air, and space”). 
 284.   See Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 233, 233 (2013) 
[hereinafter Schmitt, Classification] (stating that classifying a conflict as either international or non-
international “is always the first step” in ILH analysis). 
 285.   See id. at 236–39 (describing the ways in which the Geneva Conventions apply to armed 
conflicts). 
 286.   Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Cyberwar:  A Response to the Ethics of Cyberweapons, 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/international-law-
and-cyberwar-a-response-to-the-ethics-of-cyberweapons/. 
 287.   Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 
27–Sept. 7, 1990, Rep. of the Secretariat, at 108–14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1991) (describing 
when law enforcement officials may properly use force). 
 288.   Schmitt, Classification, supra note 284, at 239–40. 
 289.   The accepted articulation of an IAC is found in Common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  See supra note 9. 
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of opinion as to the requisite level of violence necessary to qualify a situation as an 
IAC,290 there is general consensus that the threshold is low.291  The question is how 
low.  Must there be physical consequences such as damage or injury?  If so, how 
much?  In this respect, the IGE was divided as to whether the damage to Iranian 
centrifuges during the Stuxnet operations crossed the armed conflict line, assuming, 
of course, that other States were behind the operation.292  There is evidently ample 
room for States to begin the process of developing the threshold vis-à-vis cyber 
operations. 
Characterization of a situation as a NIAC, that is, conflict between a State and 
an organized armed group, or between two or more organized armed groups, is even 
more challenging in the cyber context.293  Like IAC, once a situation qualifies as a 
NIAC, any cyber operations occurring as an element of that conflict will be governed 
by IHL.294  A purely cyber exchange would be assessed against the two requirements 
for a NIAC articulated in the Tadić judgment by the ICTY for kinetic conflict.295  
There the tribunal held that the hostilities in question must have reached a particular 
level of intensity such that they can be distinguished from mere civil disturbances, 
riots, and the like, and they must involve an organized armed group.296 
This test raises the question of whether a cyber campaign can qualify as 
sufficiently intense to satisfy the first criterion.  Is the issue simply one of 
consequences, such that only cyber operations that, for example, result in widespread 
destruction or death qualify?  Or does intensity refer to operations of a particular 
nature, like those that are violent in nature and occur openly?  And may a group that 
is organized entirely online qualify as an organized armed group for the purpose of 
meeting the second criterion?  It is common for members of online groups to not 
know each other.297  May such a group be “organized” in the IHL sense?298  How 
would it enforce discipline, a commonly accepted requirement for organization?299  
What if, as happened in the Estonia and Georgia cases, individuals throughout a 
country, and even abroad, began conducting cyber operations against the State based 
solely on online calls to do so?300  Should such operations be considered a NIAC if 
 
 290.   See TALLINN MANUAL r. 22 cmt. 12 (noting that “controversy exists as to the threshold of the 
requisite violence”). 
 291.   Id. 
 292.   Id. r. 22 cmt. 14. 
 293.   The accepted articulation of a NIAC is found in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  See supra note 9. 
 294.   See Herbert Lin, Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
515 (2012) (commenting that non-state actors’ relevance increases in cyber conflict and discussing what 
should be done about cyber conflict in international law). 
 295.   See Schmitt, Classification, supra note 284, at 245 (discussing that the ICTY stated that a NIAC 
had to be “organized” and “armed”). 
 296.   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 297.   Schmitt, Classification, supra note 284, at 246. 
 298.   Id. 
 299.   Id. 
 300.   Compare TALLINN MANUAL r. 23 cmt. 5 (discussing “the calls that appeared on the Internet for 
riots by the Russian minority in Estonia in 2007”), with Dancho Danchev, Coordinated Russia vs Georgia 
Cyber Attack in Progress, ZDNET (Aug. 11, 2008) http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/coordinated-russia-
vs-georgia-cyber-attack-in-progress/1670 (discussing “self-mobilization of the local Internet users by 
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they meet the intensity requirement?  The need for States to express opinio juris on 
the characterization of cyber conflicts is acute since the existence of an armed 
conflict, or not, will shape the response options available to them when facing hostile 
cyber operations.301 
Equally important is the second topic, the meaning of the term “attack” in the 
cyber context.302  Many IHL rules that extend protection to particular persons and 
objects, or that dictate how certain military operations may be conducted, are framed 
in terms of “attacks.”303  For instance, it is prohibited to directly “attack” civilians or 
civilian objects.304  It is also prohibited to conduct an “attack” against a valid military 
objective if the expected collateral damage would be excessive to the anticipated 
military advantage of the operation.305  The question in the cyber context is whether 
these rules are applicable to a particular cyber operation such that, for example, it 
may not be directed at civilian cyber infrastructure, or is prohibited because the 
effect of the operation on civilian systems is likely to be excessive.  They will apply if 
the cyber operation qualifies as an attack; they will not if the operation does not so 
qualify. 
It is widely agreed that a cyber operation that directly or indirectly causes 
physical damage or injury to persons during an armed conflict qualifies as an attack 
and is therefore subject to the various IHL principles and rules governing such 
operations.306  General consensus also exists that cyber operations resulting in mere 
inconvenience or slight disruption to cyber activities are not attacks in the IHL 
sense.307  The unresolved question is:  “When do cyber operations falling between 
these two ends of the continuum amount to attacks?”  The IGE struggled with this 
issue throughout the three years of the Tallinn Manual project.308  Eventually, the 
majority agreed that a cyber operation significantly affecting the “functionality” of 
cyber infrastructure is an attack.309  This conclusion was not unanimous.310  
Moreover, there were differences of opinion within the majority.  For example, the 
experts concerned disagreed on whether a cyber operation that required reloading 
the operating system or otherwise necessitated replacement of key data qualified.311 
 
spreading ‘For our motherland, brothers!’ or ‘Your country is calling you!’ hacktivist messages across web 
forums”). 
 301.   Schmitt, Classification, supra note 284, at 250 (explaining the role of opinio juris in regards to 
cyber operations). 
 302.   See id. at 239–44 (discussing the difficulties of classifying cyber operations as an attack). 
 303.   See id. (discussing attacks as defined by the ICRC). 
 304.   ICRC, From Law to Action, supra note 37, at 62, 65. 
 305.   See id. at 62 (condemning the massive killing of civilians in armed attacks and urging compliance 
with the principles of IHL). 
 306.   See TALLINN MANUAL r. 30 (“A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to 
objects.”). 
 307.   Id. r. 94. 
 308.   Schmitt, Rewired Warfare, supra note 25, at 9. 
 309.   TALLINN MANUAL r. 30 cmt. 10. 
 310.   Schmitt, Rewired Warfare, supra note 25, at 9–10 
 311.   Id.; see also Cordula Droege, Get Off My Cloud:  Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian 
Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533, 557–59 (2012) (analyzing the 
functionality test in the Tallinn Manual). 
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The issue of the qualification of cyber operations as attacks lies at the heart of 
IHL’s application in the cyber context.  A narrow interpretation of the notion would 
open the door to highly disruptive cyber operations directed against the civilian 
population and other protected persons and objects.312  Consider the impact of non-
destructive but widespread cyber operations targeting the enemy’s economy or 
governmental functions.313  The severity of the consequences would far outstrip those 
of many kinetic operations.314  It would seem incongruent to interpret IHL to allow 
the former, but not the latter.  On the other hand, a broad interpretation of attack 
could limit military operations well beyond what is currently acceptable.  
Psychological operations directed at the civilian population, for example, have long 
been conducted by militaries.315  Should such operations now be prohibited merely 
because the medium used is cyber in nature?  Unless States begin to address the issue 
of where the line between a mere operation and one that qualifies as an attack lies, 
the issue will be addressed for them by non-State actors in a manner that may prove 
difficult to reverse. 
A third area of uncertainty involves who may be attacked by cyber means.316  
Objectively, the universe of lawful human targets is well settled:  combatants, 
members of organized armed groups, and civilians who are directly participating in 
hostilities.317  Practical application, however, remains muddled.  Recall the debate 
over the purported continuous combat function criterion for targeting members of an 
organized armed group.318  In contemporary conflicts, organized armed groups often 
rely heavily on cyber assets for, inter alia, communications, logistics functions, 
intelligence gathering, and psychological operations.319  To what extent are members 
of the group who maintain and operate cyber infrastructure for these purposes 
engaging in a continuous combat function and, if they are not, should they be 
immune from direct attack on that basis?  Assuming, solely for the purpose of 
analysis, that such individuals are immune from direct attack, any expected incidental 
harm to them during an attack on other members of the group would have to be 
factored into the proportionality calculation and would be a consideration in 
 
 312.   See Droege, supra note 311, at 538–40 (discussing cyber operations’ possible effects on civilian 
infrastructure). 
 313.   See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL intro. (explaining that the United Kingdom considers cyber attacks 
to be Tier One threat to national security and “one of the most serious national security, public safety, and 
economic challenges we face as a nation”). 
 314.   Cf. id. (highlighting the seriousness with which the United Kingdom takes such threats). 
 315.   See id. r. 11 cmt. 9(h) (“[I]nternational law does not prohibit propaganda, psychological 
operations, espionage, or mere economic pressure per se.  Therefore, acts falling into these and other such 
categories are presumptively legal . . . .”); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.30:  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 1-7 (discussing psychological operations of the U.S. forces in Romania 
during World War I). 
 316.   See TALLINN MANUAL intro. (“One of the challenges States face in the cyber environment is that 
the scope and manner of international law’s applicability to cyber operations, whether in offence or 
defence, has remained unsettled since their advent.”); Droege, supra note 311, at 540–41, 553–56 
(discussing various scholarly authors’ arguments on the question of who can be attacked by cyber 
warfare). 
 317.   TALLINN MANUAL r. 34 cmts. 1–9. 
 318.   See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 319.   TALLINN MANUAL r. 6 cmt. 8; r. 22 cmts. 6–7; r. 31 cmt. 5. 
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determining the precautions that would be required in conducting the attack.320  On 
the other hand, if their role does qualify as a continuous combat function, or if no 
continuous combat function criterion exists as a matter of law, the individuals 
concerned could lawfully be attacked directly and any indirect harm they suffered 
during an attack on other persons or objects would have no proportionality or 
precautions in attack implications.321 
Similar interpretive dilemmas stand in the way of clear application of the direct 
participation by civilians in hostilities rule discussed supra.  For instance, when does 
maintenance or operation of enemy cyber infrastructure by a civilian who is not a 
member of an organized armed group rise to the level of direct participation in 
hostilities?  Is there a difference between maintenance of cyber infrastructure used 
by enemy forces for purposes unrelated to the conflict (e.g., at a military school) and 
maintenance of systems used to conduct cyber attacks?  Does it matter if the cyber 
infrastructure is dual use (used for both military and civilian purposes) or used 
exclusively by the military?  Is the creation of malware that is incidentally used by 
enemy forces an act of direct participation?  Must the malware be intended for 
enemy use?  Or must it be created for a particular enemy cyber operation?  Is passive 
cyber defense of enemy systems an act of direct participation such that contractors 
who perform the task lose their immunity from attack?  State expressions of opinio 
juris as to the proper criteria to employ in assessing these and many other activities 
would contribute measurably to consistent application of the rule in the cyber 
context and help shape it in a fashion that advances both military necessity and 
humanitarian concerns. 
A final topic illustrating the need for expressions of opinio juris involves the 
requirement to take care to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when 
conducting an attack.322  Assuming 1) IHL applies because the situation is one of 
armed conflict, 2) the cyber operation is an attack and therefore subject to the IHL 
rules thereon, and 3) the individual or object against which the cyber attack is 
directed qualifies as a lawful target, an attacker must still take all feasible measures 
to limit incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects.323  In particular, the attacker 
must engage in reasonable steps to verify the target, endeavor to employ methods or 
means of attack that minimize harm to civilians or civilian objects without sacrificing 
military advantage, and select targets the attack upon which will minimize civilian 
harm while achieving the attacker’s sought after effect.324 
 
 320.   See DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 1024 (determining that “a direct attack against the 
[civilian driver of an ammunitions truck] would have to take the probable death of the civilian driver into 
account in the proportionality assessment”). 
 321.   Id. at 994 n.6. 
 322.   AP I art. 57; 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 15. 
 323.  See AP I art. 57(2)(a)–(b) (requiring that those conducting military operations “[t]ake all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; [r]efrain from 
deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;” and cancel or suspend an attack “if it becomes 
apparent that the . . . attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated . . . .”). 
 324.   See generally id. 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
2015] THE DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OPINIO JURIS 229 
 
Application of the precautions in attack rule is problematic in the cyber context, 
in part because military commanders and operational planners generally lack the 
depth of understanding of cyber operations that they have of kinetic attacks.325  
Therefore, when cyber operations are a component of an operation, it is more 
difficult for them to understand how best to verify the status of a potential cyber 
target as a lawful military objective, identify the various options available with 
respect to cyber weapons and potential cyber targets, and assess the collateral effects 
of the proposed cyber operations.326  Additionally, the complexity of cyber 
networking and the difficulty of assessing bleed over effects complicate application of 
the obligation to take precautions in attack.327  As an example, it will often be 
difficult to gauge likely collateral damage when attacking dual use cyber 
infrastructure or cyber infrastructure networked into civilian systems.328  Without 
fully understanding the scope of potential collateral damage, identifying and 
assessing those measures available to avoid potential collateral damage becomes 
problematic. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to application of the rule is the fact that an 
attacker is only required to take “feasible” precautions in attack.329  Feasibility is 
assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account such factors as the target setting, 
the availability of other weapons, competing demands for ISR assets, and the 
intended effect of the operation.330  Doing so in the kinetic environment is difficult; 
 
 325.   See Schmitt, Speech and Manual Juxtaposed, supra note 277, at 25–31 (explaining the difficulties 
of applying international humanitarian law principles, particularly proportionality, to cyber attacks). 
 326.   For instance, an object that has both military and civilian purposes can be classified as “military,” 
and, therefore, a proper target, even if the military use of the objective is only marginal.  Droege, supra 
note 311, at 562–64.  “The consequence of this would be that in some circumstances virtually all parts of 
the Internet might qualify as a military objective because they are all possible routes for the transmission 
of military information.” Id. at 564.  See also TALLINN MANUAL r. 39 cmt. 3 (“Cyber operations pose 
unique challenges in this regard.  Consider a network that is being used for both military and civilian 
purposes.  It may be impossible to know over which part of the network military transmissions, as distinct 
from civilian ones, will pass.  In such cases, the entire network (or at least those aspects in which 
transmission is reasonably likely) qualifies as a military objective.”). 
 327.   See Droege, supra note 311, at 564 (discussing the difficulties in assessing whether cyber networks 
are civilian or military); TALLINN MANUAL r. 52 cmt. 6 (“Given the complexity of cyber operations, the 
high probability of affecting civilian systems, and the sometimes limited understanding of their nature and 
effects on the part of those charged with approving cyber operations, mission planners should, where 
feasible, have technical experts available to assist them in determining whether appropriate precautionary 
measures have been taken.”). 
 328.   See, e.g., id. at 539 (“[I]t is to a large extent impossible to differentiate between purely civilian and 
purely military computer infrastructure. . . .  [T]his poses a serious challenge to one of the cardinal 
principles of IHL, namely the principle of distinction between military and civilian objects.  Moreover, 
even if military and civilian computers or computer systems are not entirely one and the same, 
interconnectivity means that the effects of an attack on a military target may not be confined to this 
target. . . .  [A]n attack on a military computer system may well also damage civilian computer systems, 
which, in turn, may be vital for some civilian services such as water or electricity supply or the transfer of 
assets.”). 
 329.   See AP I art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . .  [t]ake all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 330.   See TALLINN MANUAL r. 53 cmt. 5 (“[F]easible precautions might include gathering intelligence 
on the network through mapping or other processes in order to allow those responsible reasonably to 
determine the attack’s likely effects, particularly on the civilian population or civilian objects.  There is no 
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in light of the factors just mentioned,331 assessing feasibility in the cyber environment 
will be even more so.  As with the example, it is essential that States begin to shape 
expectations as to the requisite precautions in cyber attack.  Inattention to this 
practical need risks the advent of requirements that may frustrate the achievement of 
legitimate military objectives. 
The four examples are far from exhaustive.  However they do illustrate the 
severity of risks that States will be assuming if the trend of refraining from offering 
clear expressions of opinio juris regarding IHL endures.  The risks are particularly 
grave with respect to cyber operations because such operations are typically 
classified.  Thus, there will often be no visible State practice from which to draw even 
inferences of opinio juris.  As non-State actors engage in activities that take the place 
of State expressions of opinio juris in the development and interpretation of IHL 
cyber norms, they may well be operating on partial or faulty information as to actual 
State practice. 
CONCLUSION 
This has been an article about process, not substance.  It is meant to be neither 
polemical nor Manichean.  It offers no comment on any position that has been 
asserted by non-State actors or States with respect to the interpretation of extant 
IHL or its apparent evolutionary vector.  Instead, we simply lament the fact that 
States, perhaps without even realizing they have been doing so, are ceding control 
over the content, interpretation, and development of IHL to others.  Greater 
sensitivity on the part of States to the centrality of expressing opinio juris to law 
formation and interpretation appears merited. 
The reluctance of States and their legal representatives to communicate and 
commit to clear views on IHL matters vitiates legal discourse, degrading the 
functioning and development of a critical aspect of the international legal system.  
Scholars, commentators, advocates, judges, and even States’ own diplomats and legal 
advisors are by now accustomed to resorting to speculation to resolve ambiguity 
concerning any number of State views on IHL.  Paradoxically, in the absence of State 
views, such speculation can become, over time, the law.  Unless the trend is reversed, 
States stand in peril of losing sway over debates that may significantly and adversely 
impact their freedom of action on the battlefield, or even place their civilian 
population at increased risk. 
In our view, a number of important and emerging legal issues related to cyber 
operations during armed conflict are now ripe for expressions of opinio juris by 
States, including the United States.  This should be unsurprising since not one of the 
existing IHL principle or rules, treaty or customary, was crafted or crystallized with 
cyber operations in mind.  Accordingly, State expressions of opinio juris take on 
added importance as cyber capabilities are developed and fielded. 
Whether to announce doctrinal details and clarifications, preserve flexibility 
through confirmation of ambiguity, or simply reject or confirm the existence of 
 
obligation to take measures that are not feasible.”). 
 331.   See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 22 (discussing the fact that “small and densely populated 
countries . . . would find it difficult to separate civilians and civilian objects from military objectives and 
that even large countries would find such separation difficult or impossible to arrange in many cases”). 
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particular norms, such expression of opinio juris manage important State legal and 
operational interests.  Therefore, State legal agencies and agents, particularly 
Ministries and Departments of Defense, must be equipped, organized, and 
empowered to participate actively in the interpretation and development of IHL.  
States, and specially affected States in particular, must make responses to emerging 
IHL scholarship, investigations and jurisprudence a regular facet of their opinio juris.  
Reinvigorating opinio juris would do more than satisfy international law 
sovereigntists.  It would foster the restoration of the pluralistic IHL dialogue that 
formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between military necessity and 
humanitarian considerations that necessarily underpins IHL.  In no field is such 
activism in greater demand than the international regulation of cyber warfare. 
 
